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Abstract 
1be thrust of tlm research paper is to examine the inflation information that is contained in the 
output gap using the New Keynesian Phillips Curve frrurework. As informed by the mode� the 
study also sets to investigate inflation persistence and the influence of forward inertia on the 
C\llTent inflation This paper follows the Gali and Monacelli (2005) of the small open-economy 
type of model However, the c\llTent study differs by introducing external :factors (trade and real 
exchange rate) not only on the hybrid mode� also on the backward, forward and the hybrid 
restricted models for time-series data (1971-2017) of all twenty (20) economies considered in the 
study. We adopt two measures of output gaps; the tmivariate (Hodrick Prescott) and the 
Multivariate (Kalman) gap estirmtion approaches and deploy instrument-based (Generalized 
Method of Moment & Two-Stage Least Square) and non-instrument based (Bayes and Ordinary 
Least Square) econometric techniques to generate the structural parameters. After estimating the 
results, we resolve that the developed economies' data appropriately fit the backward-looking 
model Thus, the output gap m:>tmt pressure on the inflation processes in those economies and the 
inflation follows first autoregressive process; the past inflation. This study does not find strong 
supportive evidence on gap-inflation relationship in most of the emerging economies. 1be findings 
in the developing economies are not as much revealing but fotmd few evidences. We could not 
ascertain a specific type of model for all these cotmtries. Nigeria and Pakistan follow the backward 
mode� Bangladesh follows hybrid model and Egypt; Indonesia and Kenya follow hybrid restricted 
type of model Though, there was no doubt relationship exists in these highlighted economies, we 
could not technically ascertain consistencies as exhibited by the backward-looking models in the 
developed economies. We fotmd inflation to be persistent in all economies. On the external :factors, 
we completely support that trade and exchange rate enters the domestic inflation equation 
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Price stabilization is a core responsibility of m:metary authority. This is required for a 
efficient nmning of economic activities. Usually, an tmStable general price level results in spiral 
pressures on employment, investment, output, future uncertainties, gain illusion etc. Sometiires, a 
prolonged distortion of the aggregate prices causes an economic eruption on key sectors in the 
economy. This calls for a prudent, transparent, consistent and disciplined policies by the monetary 
authorities. 
Price instability can either be deflationary or inflationary. However, the latter is often 
mentioned in literature. Two major reasons stand out why inflationary pressure occupies the mind 
of scholars. First, its frequent occurrences. Second, the macroeconomic consequences1 on the 
economy. The experience of deflationary periods, however, is also widely acknowledged in 
literature, for example, the events of 1920s and 1930s depression in United States, Early 1980s 
and 1990s global recessions. There are several other economic crises tthat have been investigated; 
the Opec Oil Price Shock (1973), the Japanese Asset Price Bubble (1986-2003), the Black Monday 
(1987), the Asian Financial Crisis (1997 &1998), the Dot-Com Bubble (2000) and the F.conomic 
Mehdown (2008). 
The impact of inflation is pervasive. The persistent price increase affects significantly the 
core conslU1lption basket of average conswner, Sehar and Adiqa (2011), though, the 
macroeconomic situation during inflationary crises vary for different economy's categories. Past 
studies on macroeconomic consequences and solution to inflation have revealed the importance of 
1 The 1920s German hyperinflation and two decade long Zimbabwe hyperinflation 
1 
identifying the sources of inflationary pressure ahead proffering policy strategies. Yet, there are 
diverse scholarly opinions on inflation's drivers. 
The mainstream economists (such as Friedman Milton) believed inflation is always and 
everywhere rmnetary phenorrena. This is studied in the quantity theory of rooney. The 
tmderpinning relies heavily on the rronetary expansion, ceteris panbus, causes persistent increase 
in general price level 
The prominent debate on drivers of inflation has risen beyond rronetary explanation in 
recent decades. 1be reasons for price pressures in the dorrestic economy have been proven to look 
outside Jarge chunk of rroney in the circulation, though the importance of volurre of rmney in 
circulation still play significant role in determining inflation level 
The macroeconomic influences of fi.mdarrentals on inflation level is widely recognized in 
research papers. Hun, Tony and John (2012) highlights, arrong others, oil price and rice prices as 
the strongest in Vietnarrese inflation Sehar, et al (2011) links external factors through trade 
openness and exchange rate to the dorrestic inflation in Pakistan The authors derronstrate the 
vulnerabil ity of inflation to foreign shocks. De Grauwe & Schnabl (2008) supports the impact of 
stable exchange rate for a productive inflation in the Eastern and Central European economjes. 
The study of determinants of inflation in the contemporary macroeconomic investigat ion 
is, to say the least, inexha usti ve. However, the perfonnance of output gap in predicting the inflation 
dynamics has engendered a large body of academic literature. The developrrent of this profound 
research was built on the AW Phillip (1962). Over the years, several studies have carried out a 
thorough enquiries between output gap and inflation, yet there is lack of consensus. 
Output gap is purely a deviation from full employrrent output. The central banks' 
stabilization goal is to maintain a close gap between the natural output level and actual output. In 
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the event these gaps are too wide to acconnmdate non-accelerating inflation, the economy heats 
up which results to inflationary pressure, otherwise, causes deflationary pressure. This hampers 
the rronetary capabilities. This theory is studied in New Keynesian Phillip Curve (NKPC). 
1be importance of output gap cannot go beyond emphasis. A recessionary gap (crises) 
explains labor idleness and lack of full capital utilization On the other hand, a generic symptom 
of loss of the economic public confidence which dampens factor productivity and economic 
growth. The trickle-down effect becomes evident on prices in the absence of corrective policy 
measures. The dimension of inflationary gap is sirniJar to the above. The output outruns its 
potential and gives a blurry picture on how real output has changed over-time. At the initial stage, 
the economic public are deluded and often time pressure in the economic activities strains fuctor 
capacity. The illusion becomes clear when wage rate and prices begin to re-adjust and constnnption 
baskets start to shrink. The aggregate implication on the economy worsens without irrnnediate 
corrective remedy. Though, the corrective policies are essential during these crises, however, 
some proactive measures are rrore preferred when output gap enters significantly into inflation 
processes in the economy 
Some studies conclude that onJy a large deviation from full employment output 
significantly affects the aggregate price level Abbas (2015) asserted that the importance of output 
gap in the inflation equation can onJy be verified when output gap is sufficiently large. Weidner 
and Williams (2009) asked a question of economic importance on 2009-US economic recessions, 
"how big is the output gap on the inflation", and showed comparatively, inflation responds less to 
the small deviation from the potential output in the year. 
The inflation inertia is other topical debate on inflation prediction In the baseline NKPC, 
inflation is forward looking. The backward rrodel predicts inflation persistence. The hybrid model 
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combines the baseline and the backward. Authors have dermnstrated the importance of lead and 
lag inflation in estimating current inflation in the close economy. Gali & Monacelli (2005) also 
investigated the inclusion of trade and real exchange rate on the inflation dynamics. 
1be studies on the output gap - inflation dynamics are policy ingredients in di:ffurent 
categories of economies. The central banks rely on the pattern of the gaps in their policy 
dehberation and s trategy. When price level destabilizes, resulting from deviation of aggregate 
demand from its potentia� it triggers the policy custodians to either adopts short-term 
expansionary/contractionary policy to re-balance aggregate prices, Orphanides and Van Norden 
(2005). This makes the study relevant to rronetary perfonrance in all col.Ultries. Nonetheless, 
literature is drought of consistent results on output gap- inflation dynamics 
The empirical investigation between output-gap and inflation process is widely studied in 
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) rmdel This is because the theoretic fuurework is 
micro-founded, and it includes price resistance. Thus, the rrodel serves as channeling mechanis m 
between real output pressure and the inflation dynamics. This rrodel is also rrore profound as it 
incorporates rational expectation theory into the conventional Phillips Curve. Thus, I advocate for 
this framework in the current study. 
1.1 Justification of the Study 
Following the disparities in literature, this study is set to investigate the data compatibil iy 
in the NKPC fuurework. This study contnbutes new knowledge through the following. Due to 
lack of empirical consensus in previous findings, the current study poises to explore the 
perfonrance of variety of these rrodels in twenty (20) cotmtries. The col.Ultries are in categories; 
developed, errerging and developing economies. To our knowledge, the past empiri�a 1 
conversation on the output gap-inflation nexus is dearth of the discussion on the validity of output 
4 
gap in explaining inflation in emerging and developing economies. This paper fills this vacUlllll in 
the literature. Moreover, Jack of agreement on the relationship between these important policy 
variables in the developed economies motivates me to investigate different model varieties in the 
NKPC framework. Thus, the study examines and compares how the models fit the data in these 
economy's categories and how responses are best incorporated into monetary policy planning. I 
understand that the policy implication of my findings is a spotlight in the growing empiric literature 
on gap-inflation relationship, this study uses sound methodology and estimation techniques. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
1be empiric success of inflation forecasting across different categories of ecooomies is fur 
from been achievable without clear understanding of the key drivers of the aggregate prices. 
However, the development of NKPC bas eased the forecast stress and complex behavior of the 
inflation dynamics for the monetary authority, also allows a better control of the :financial system. 
Satt� Malik and Saghir (2007) alluded that the mode� inflation adjustment equation, is the vital in 
the trinity- Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium. 1be output gap plays a very crucial role in 
this fr urework, as some argued, it is most important in the inflation dynamics; see Tiwari, Oros 
and Albulescu (2014, pp.465). 
The key objective is to examine the relationship between output gap and inflation in the 
three categories of economies with time-series data. 1be results are compared to establish the 
appropriate methodologies that reveal the impact of gaps on the inflation in each economy. The 
study also determines the theoretic inflation inertias to verify whether inflation persists based on 
the past inflation or inflation is forward looking or both in all the selected ecooomies. The 
estimations are performed using Generalized Method of Moment, Two-Sage Least Square, 
Ordinary Least Square and Bayes. 
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1.3 Hypotheses 
1be study investigates the impact of output gap in the inflation equation The rationale for 
incorporating output gap information in the inflation is based on the dynamism of gaps along the 
business cycle and the pressure on certain macroeconomic fundarrentals. This pressure in the 
economic activities forms the mechanism with which gap information penetrate the changes in the 
general price level Moreover, inflation can either persist or look backward or do both. 1be impact 
of expectation, sometimes from public perception on future expansion policy, often influences the 
current price behavior through large responses from economic agents. In the sarre vein, past 
inflation impacts the economic agents' discretion on how prices should be formed in the current 
period. This allows inflation to follow a backward inertia. The external contnbution to price 
changes, to large extent, may result from the dynamism in trade arrangement and exchange rate 
with rest of the world. 1bese hypothetical statements are carefully examined in this study. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
'The remainder of the study is organized in five chapters. Chapter two presents literature 
review on output gap - inflation nexus. Chapter three details output gap movement and inflation 
behavior in all the selected countries. Chapter four highlights the methodology, the data and the 
sources of the data used in this paper. In the chapter five, the collected data are analyz.ed, and 
results are discussed. I conclude and recommend policies in chapter six. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
CHAPfER TWO 
The foundation of the theoretic framework of output gap - inflation nexus was the findings 
captured in the work of A. W Phillips (1962) 2. Though, the piece attracted wide debates during the 
decade on both theoretical wderpinnings and empirical evidence, Phillips Curve has evolved 
among theorists. The Phillips Curve has been redefined in several ways (Abbas & MSgro, 2011)3. 
The irmovation on the Imdel has changed the trajectory of the controversy on the existing 
relationship between real economic activities and inflation dynamics. Taylor (1980), Rotemberg 
(1982), Calvo (1983), Gali and Gertler (1999& 2005) and in recent year Zhang et al (2009) found 
significance in stochastic output deviation on the inflation equation. On the other hand, Mankiw 
(2001), Fuhrer and More (1995) and Kuttner and Robinson (2010) criticized the existence ofthis 
relationship. 
Initially, the development of rational expectation was the hallmark to conceptualize the 
interaction on output gap and inflation. However, the evolution of new methodological and 
theoretical frameworks has helped to moderate the different ideological beliefS on the output gap 
and inflation dynamics. 
Since the time authors started to investigate the effects of macroeconomic fi.mdamental s  on 
the inflation dynamics, large body of literature on the output gap and inflation has played central 
role in shaping the policy-maki ng process. In other words, there is usually back and forth feedback 
between the model performance and the policy rules; see Taylor (1980). 
2 A.W Phillips was first renown economist to investigate the negative relationship between unemployment and 
inflation. He carried out a notable empirical analysis on wage inflation and unemployment using the data from 
United Kingdom 
3 Syed Kanwar Abbas & Pasquale MSgro (2011) opined that Phillips Curve has appeared in different versions and 
the key point of departure from the traditional Philips Curve is the New Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC) 
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The empirical findings on output gap and inflation dynamics are polarized. The outcomes 
of the model have varied based on difierent methodological approaches and inability of the 
structural model to fit the data in some economies; see Rudd and Whe1an (2007). The follow ing 
are the empiric outcomes on the output gap and inflation. 
Zhang and Murasawa (2011) having employed the new Bayesian multivariate Beveridge­
Nelson decomposition in estimating output gap, shows the Chinese data (quarterly, 1979-2010) 
performs well in explaining the inflation dynamics better than the old methods of output gap 
measures. The study also expounds that inflation expectation affects current inflation more 
dominantly than the Jagged inflation. However, advocates that the backward-looking component 
(Jagged inflation) was fundrunmtal in the structural model despite its negligible role; see also Gali, 
et al (1999). They claim some agents are backward looking in price setting, thus, makes the past 
inflation behavior enters monetary policy rules in responding to the output gap. 
Zhang and Murasawa (2012) investigates the relationship between the output gap and 
inflation in both baseline and the extended NKPC using the same methodology and Chinese data 
as in Zhang et al (2011) but rather chose to examine the structural breaks in the underlying 
equation. They challenged the past studies on the assumption of a mean-reverting inflation process 
through these structural breaks. Moreover, they acknowledged that Chinese economic reform in 
1990s caused changes in monetary policy administration. Thus, causing changes in the theoretical 
framework in its NKPC model The structural break was investigated through heteroskedascity­
robust Quandt-Andrews unknown break point test and found an evidence of structural break in the 
inflation process in China, with break date at second quarter of 1999. The study reiterates their 
previous findings on output gap and inflation dynamics but concludes: changes in the effect of 
output gap on inflation resuhs to the Chinese disinflation experience; see pp. I I. 
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Zhang, Osborn and Kim (2009) addresses the problem of serial correlation in output gap-
inflation dynamics using the extended NPKC rrodel for quarterly United States data (1968 -2005). 
As speculated, they fotmd an evidence of serial correlation in the styliz.ed rrodei however, 
employed contemporary econometric tools to eliminate this problem In contrast to a strand of 
studies on US data (such work by Gali et al,1999), they fotmd a significant relationship between 
inflation and output gap measured by conventional4 method when expected inflation is estimated 
by median one-quarter ahead SPF forecasts. 1bey alluded that the result was also the same when 
inflation expectation was captured by observed inflation forecasts. In short, they emphasized that 
output gap as a driving force for inflation. On inflation inertia, their result reveals backward-
looking inflation as predominant cause for inflation persistence. 1beir findings contrast with Zhang 
et al(2011 & 2012), however, reached the same policy advice; claiming rronetary policy rules 
should derive inflation target from both expected and past inflation. The study also dermnstrates 
the importance of including rrore lags in the inflation equations. 
In another profotmd study on output gap and inflation dynamics on quarterly United States 
data (1959-2013), Valadkhani (2015) derronstrates the impact ofvariations5 in output gap on 
inflation using error correction mechanism The empiric results summarize that only large 
variations in output gap affect inflation They suggested that poor measurement of output 
variations could cause ambiguity in the impact of output gap on the inflation changes. 1beir 
methodological approach in separating the output gap int� different classes of variations relied on 
the standard norrra1 distnbution such that there were approximately equal non-zero observation in 
4 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) potential output and HP filter 
s Variations in the output gap are categorized into: large-positive; large-negative and small-medium 
positive/negative output gap 
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each category; see pp. 12.  Moreover, the study proves the labor cost and oil price to be the major 
inflation drivers in the Jong-nm. 
Extending the work of Gali and Monacelli (2005) 6 on the small open economy type NKPC 
with the Australian quarterly data (1 959-2010), Abbas, Bhattacharya & Mallick (2016) found 
contrasting evidence. 1be study estimated several versions of conventional rrodel that include the 
terms of trade and real exchange rate. 1be paper also interchanged marginal cost and output gap 
to capture the driving force variable in the inflation dynamics. From these simulated processes, the 
authors derronstrate a lack of support for any interaction between output-gap -inflation rrodel and 
trade, and changes in exchange rate. That is, the study found muted support for open-economy 
type of models; see pp. 14. 1bese rrodels; developed in Gali et al (2005), were b�d for their 
unrealistic assumption of complete exchange rate pass-through that is not consistent with data. 
Yet, the study lends support for output gap .in the inflation rrodel 
However, the previous firxling.5 by Abbas and Sgro (20 1 1 )  stand unparallel to the 
conclusion reached by Abbas et al (2016) for Australian data (1 959-2009). They denied the 
outcomes of NKPC that were evident in USA and Euro area. lbey asserted that neither margina I 
cost nor output gap; proxied for the driving force variable, contnbute to the dynamic behavior of 
inflation dynamics in Australia across nwnber of instrurrents. To them, for the whole sample 
period, inflation persists as a result of future inflation inertia while Australian inflation was only 
backward looking after 1980s. In generai forward looking model better explains the inflation 
6 Gali and Monacelli (2005) incorporates the influence of external factors on the conventional close-economy 
NKPC, such factors (exchange rates changes and terms of trade) were derronstrated to enter into the inflation 
equations. Some have criticized (including Abbas, Bhattacharya & Mallick, 2016 ) on the inability of the rrodel to 
tit to Australian data. There had been strong evidence that terms of trade and exchange rate do not c ause inflation 
dynamics. This new theoretical framework does not support what is in empirics. The rrodel was also rejected for 
ignoring the interest rate rrodel and the IS equation that contain the ingredients to address identification problem in 
the developed rrodel; see Abbas,etal. (2016, pp.22). 
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dynamics for the country. The study further concludes that the impact of expected inflation on 
CWTent inflation was similar before and after 1 980s. 
The paper by Halka and Kotlowski (2014) contradicts the Abbas, et al (2016). They folllld, 
however, evidence for the Gali et al (2005) small-open economy NKPC hypothesis in Polish 
economy using the disaggregated consumer price index. lbough, the study accotmts that more 
than fifty-percent changes in inflation emanates from the output gap in the service and non-durable 
goods sector, about one-third of the changes in inflation resuh from exchange rate dynamics. The 
finding supports the inclusion of exchange rate dynamics in the durable-tradable inflation equation. 
The reason for this evidence in Poland was explained to be the impact of economic globalization 
and increasing trade-openness of the cotmtry. 
Kara, Ogunc, Oz.Jale and Sarikaya (2007) investigated the sensitivity of different measures 
of output gap on inflation dynamics and how these are conditioned by the effect of real exchange 
rate in Turkish economy. They show output gap and two lags of inflation inertia influence inflation, 
however, demonstrates that output gap contacts/expands consequent on depreciation/appreciation 
of Turkish currency. The �work with which expansionary/contractionary output gap occurs 
was: higher/lower price of imported capital goods that result from the appreciation/depreciation 
cause an increase/decrease in domestic production. 
Osman, Louis and Balli (2008) conducted a study on output gap-inflation equation in Arab 
Gulf Cooperation CollllCil Colllltries7 (AGCC) using annual data from 1 970-2006. They found no 
relationship between these two variables in these economies, except in Oman and Saudi Arabia. 
They concluded that output gap and non-oil output gap in these other economies do not have 
predictive power for inflation forecasting. 
7 United Arab Emirate (U AE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman 
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Satti, Malik and Saghir (2007) empirically examined the influence of output gap on 
inflation adjustment in the NKPC framework. Though, they found support for a relationship, they 
found output gap not to be major driver of inflation. The Pakistan data :failed to validate the past 
evidence on output gap-inflation m:>vetrent. 
Tiwari, Oros and Albu1escu (2014) shows the French data on output gap cause the changes 
in inflation in both short- and rredium. nm.. They argued, to substantially reveal thIB relationship, 
the conventional econorretric output gap rreasure should be thrusted away in fuvor of the wavelet 
measures. 
Orphanides and Van Norden (2005) could not ascertain the potentials of output gap in 
predicting inflation. Using United States quarterly data (1965-2003), the study differentiated the 
forecasting ability of output gap8 based on ex post analysis and simulated real-tnre out-of sample 
analysis in inflation. They found the fonner has an element of predictive power on inflation, but 
the impact of the latter, to them, was illusory. The authors, however, raised a caveat on invalidation 
of the NKPC framework based on their findings in United States data. 
The thesis on the output gap and inflation model has gained prominence as shown in the 
literature above. The application of the NKPC to investigate output gap - inflation nexus in rmst 
economies has resulted to the disparities in findings. The following identifies the sources of the 
contention in the literature. 
The lack of consensus in the literature on the output gap9 and price/wage inflation relation 
has provoked rigorous investigation on the output gap as a major driving force variable. Some 
8 Orphanides, et al. (2005) categorized the ex post analysis that uses revised output gap as suggested usefulness and 
the output gap based simulated real-time out-of-saJ11)1e as operational usefulness; see pp.3. 
9 Mohamed Osman (201 I). The output gap is estimated by the decomposing the actual output (real GDP) into 
structural (natural rate ofoutput) and conjunctural components applying different methodologies. The naturdl rate 
of output is the trend component and the output gap is the transitory component. 
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studies (soch work of Gali et al, 200 1 )  denied the credentials of output gap in predicting inflation 
but advocated for real marginal cost; proxied by the labor share of income (Mavroeidis et al, 2012; 
pp.12). However, Rudd and Whelan (2007) was a strong advocate for the use of output gap 1 o in 
the NKPC frarrework; see also Zhang et al (20 1 1 )  and Paul (2009). 
Using the hybrid NKPC - forward and backward-looking inflation te� and the deviation 
of the labor share of income as the forcing variables - Gali, et al (1 999) opined that the real 
economic activities connnand significance on changes in inflation. However, this approach, 
especially the proxy used to capture the slope in the rmde� has been fullowed but also de-
popularized by many (Rudd and Whelan, 2007; Neiss and Nelson,2005; Nason and Smith, 2008; 
Dufour, J.M, Khalaf , L & Kichian, M, 2006; Ma, A, 2002, Satti, et al, 2007). 
The deficiency in the empirical consistence on the output gap measurement has 
significantly led to its poor perforrmnce in estimating the slope of inflation in the NKPC 
frairework. Some of these methods are drought of economic underpinnings. Moreover, the ability 
to separate the W10bserved actual output deviation from its potential-steady state equihbri u m  
level' 1 is highly questionable. The steady state/natural rate of output and output gap are not directly 
measurable. The inherent W10bservability of output gap led to development of different approaches 
of estimation: Statistica� structural and mixed methods 12 (see Osman, 201 1 ;  Basistha and Nelson, 
2007). The estimates from these different approaches vary and there is no universal consensus on 
rmst appropriate method (Weidner and Williams, 2009, pp.I) 
10 The reason for rating output gap above the labor share of income is that output gap is believed to be pro-cyclical 
and easily adjust during the downward pressure in the economic activities. 
1 1  Mankiw (2003). Potential output level is a full e1T'4'loyment output; where all factor inputs are fully utili22d at 
which unelll'loyment is at its natural rate. 
12 Statistical method is mechanical without economics underpinning, structural method incorpuratt:s economic 
theory while the mixed used both statistical and structural in the estimation, Mohamed Osman (201 1). 
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Output gap estimation using statistical technique13 is pervaded in the empiOCal literature; 
roost comrrxmly used are Hodrick and Prescott (hence, HP) fiher, Unobserved components roodel, 
Linear trend method and frequency domain filter. In recent literature, all these methods have lost 
credence in estimating the cyclical movement of economic activities. 
Osman. et al (2010), on the output gap measures in the AGCC 14 countries, reveals 
consi5tencies in the method of estimation but found no supports for any future inflation 
information revealed in the output gap. However, they found that these methods contain similar 
information about macroeconomic variables especially inflation This resuh reechoes the work of 
Orphanides, et al (2005)15. 
Amidst the wide criticism on the statistical methodology, literature is not scarce on its 
application K han  (2004) constructed the HP filter and the quadratic tirne-detrending (QD) on 51  
cmmtries to investigate the price-stickiness, trend inflation and output dynamics. The research 
came out with interesting resuhs. 1be study lends support to previous work that used pure 
statistical technique for output gap estimation Zhang, et al (2009) also employed Congressional 
Budget Office potential output and HP filter in estimating US output gap. 
In contrast, a stream of studies blames the lack of output gap significance in inflation 
determination on the purely- statistically methodological approach 1be gap measures that are 
based on multivariate rrodel provXle rrore exact information in the rrodelling process (Zhang et 
al, 2012). This influential paper criticize t.mivariate method for its simplicity and lack of 
l3 The statistical approach is characterized by srroothness oftrend or imposes cycle of the u nderlying variable 
(Zhang, et al., 2011, pp. 2) 
14 AGCC: Arab Q.ilf Corporation Council Countries 
1 5  Orphanides and Norden (2005) found different measure of output gap contain inflation information and can 
forecast inflation changes based on ex post analysis, however, alluded that the predictive ability is illusory (see 
pp.16) 
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infonration that could be advantageous to understanding the interacting endogeneity m the 
macroeconomic variables (see pp.2). 
Zhang, et al (201 1 )  compares ahernative univariate, and multivariate output gaps measures 
based on the following approach: the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition method, HP filtering, 
Linear and quadratic detrending. 1be found that only the multivariate based output gap measures 
significantly cause inflation dynamics in the NKPC framework; see pp.4 
1be estimation that is based on multivariate filtering is not free from criticism The 
credentials for standard multivariate output gap measures to explain the inflation dynamics is also 
wXlely discredited. The justification for multivariate over tmivariate measure is discotmtenanced 
for its static assumption In fact, Orphanides, et al 2005, pp.16; Valadkhan� 2015, found 
similarity in uni.variate and muhivariate filtering vis-a-vis inflation prediction Moreover, predict 
that the multivariate filtering lacks adequate potency to eliminate the dynamics in economic 
behavior. 
Kara, et al (2007)16 rejects the muhivariate filter framework based on the attributed 
assumption of time-invariant system parameters. Their work shows a significant improvement on 
Kalman filter: the extended kalman filter (EKF). The EKF technique was rated over multivariate 
method (the standard Kamm filter) using the Turkish macroeconomic data. They explained that 
the extended Kalman filters have better revision characteristics than the rivals (see pp.17). 
However, EKF reveals larger difference when compared to the HP filters. 
16 Kara, et al. (2007) however, found multivariate filtering techniques better off univariate techniques such as HP 
filter. They explained, the in1>lication of the disparity of these methods of estimation on monetary policy was huge 
and counter-reacting (see pp. I 8). Their results reveal that output gap estimation that are based on HP and standard 
Kalman filters are misleading, especially when large upward and downward movement away fro m  the natural rate of 
output; see pp. 17. They conclude that HP filter is purely statistical without economic content. 
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The fierce empirical controversy on the significance of the output gap-inflation frarrework 
has cast doubt on the traditional NKPC rmdel development. Following the Calvo (1 983), the 
baseline17 NKPC model is buih on the platform of f01ward-looking type inflation equation. 
However, verse literature has abnegated the baseline rmdel to construct the relationship among 
economic funclarrentals. 
Kara, et al (2007) :framework relied on backward-looking type of inflation equation Their 
structural rmdel contains two lagged inflation tenm, time-varying output gap18 and real effective 
exchange rate (REER). The proposition is that inflation persists based on the two lagged inflation 
inertial tenns and the REER captures the dynamics on inflation through production cost and 
imports' prices. The empir£ resuhs came out significantly persuasive. 
Rood and Whelan (2007) concludes that the conventional19 NKPC does not fit data 
appropriately, also Woodford (2001) and Sbordone (2005). The United States data confirmed the 
data-model incompatibility as revealed in the paper of Gali, et al ( 1 999) and Fuhrer and Moore 
(1 995). The effect of misspecification of this type of model leads to rmnetary misdirection with 
macroeconomic consequences that can lead to monetary authority incredibility and poor economic 
regulation 
To understand the inflation dynamics adequately, the model is then synthesized to 
incorporate the past and future changes in prices inclOOing output gap/real marginal cost; the 
hybrid NKPC. The belief was that, :fraction of the finn.5 adjust their prices based on the previous 
11 The baseline rmdel is a forward looking type of inflation rmdel in which current inflation is determined by 
inmediate future inflation and marginal cost/output gap (see Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1979 and Calvo, 1983) 
18 The rmdel is estimated in a simultaneous system of equation featuring the time-varying output gap. The lagged 
output gap is hypothesized to affect inflation such that there was no contefl1>oraneity. The changes in price resulting 
from the supply side takes time to reflect on production cost pressure; see Kara, et al. 2007, pp.4-5 
19 The standard output gap-inflation frarrework in the NKPC rmdel was purely forward looking phenorrenon. Abbas 
and Sgro (2011)  alluded that the verse erq>irical literature does not find support for the effect of output gap and pure 
expectation on inflation dynamics . 
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inflation (see Christiano, Eichenbaum arxi Evans, 2005 - proposed price indexation to past inflation 
behavior; Marcel and Kim, 2010) while some update prices based on the future infonnation 
content; see Rotemberg ( 1 982); Taylor ( 1 979) & Calvo, 1983. The performance of this new output 
gap-inflation model has been mixed. 
The hybrid version has risen to prominence following the influential works of Furher, et 
al (1995) arxi Gali, et al (1999, 2005). Satti, et al (2007) revealed that the future expectation was 
significantly important in determining inflation in the hybrid framework using Pakistan data. To 
them, the backward inertial in the inflation model is less significant (see, pp. 3). Their findings 
also reaffirm the justification for real marginal cost as the driving force variable in the inflation 
equation Zhang, et al (20 1 1 )  reparametrized the hybrid version through the inclusion of 
differenced inflation arxi imposing convex restriction20 on the mode� see pp. 5 . Zhang, et aL(2009) 
fuvors hybrid version with convex restriction according to earlier studies but departed from the 
findings that relegates the use of output gap in favor of labor share of income as the driving force 
for inflation dynamics. 
The approaches adopted in estimating expectation have led to different findings. The 
expected inflation is an unobserved variable. Many authors have proxied expected inflation with 
the realized inflation data using suitable instruments and constructing generalized instrumental 
variable technique, deriving expected inflation by a reduced-form model such as Vector 
Atttoregressive and the direct measure of estimation (Mavroeidis, et al, 2014). All these 
approaches fit well with Generalized Method of Moment econometric technique but not without 
empirical fuilure. 
20 Convex restriction sums the expected lead and lagged inflation to one. This was justified in some studies to allay 
the non-mean reversion in the inflation data. 
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To eliminate the presence of endogeneity 111 the inflation equation, instruments are 
indispensable. However, the choice of instruments and resulting identification problem have 
warranted the Jack of consistent outcomes in the output gap- inflation relation. Some of these 
perplexing disparities in the literature come from different instruments used. 1be existence of weak 
instruments contaminates the crystal predictability power of output gap in the inflation model. 
Some authors argued that the absence of uniformity in the literature emerged from the weak 
instrument and identification2 1 •  1be comm:mly used instruments are lagged inflation, interest rate, 
interest rate spread, changes in te� of trade, wage, commodity price inflation. 
In addition to the above highlighted instruments, Mavroeidis, et al (2014, pp.33) used 
different nwnber of lagged inflation and forcing variables (output gap and Jabor share) and IOy-
90d yield spread. However, the instruments used in the literature are inexhaustive; see Zhang, et 
al (201 1 22 & 2012), Satti, et al (2007, pp.7)23 and Zhang et al (2009)24. 
On the other hand, the diverse estimation techniques in generating the st:n.£tural parameters 
has come llilder intense scrutiny. Tillrnann, (2009) criticized GMM estimators for having 
associated small sample problem;. Tiwari, et al. (2014, pp.2) advocated for wavelet analysis after 
highlighting the challenges in the :frequently used econometric and :frequency domain methods. 
Having identified the sources of the controversies in literature on output gap - inflation 
dynamics, the ctnTent study poises to bridge the gap based on several fimdammtal issues that were 
raised in the past studies. A verse nwnber of authors have devoted studies on investigating 
2 I Weak identification comes through instrument irrelevance. When the low correlation exists between the 
instrument(s) and the endogenous regressors, then identification will be weak (underidentified or unidentified). 
When there is weak identification is weak, the asyf11'totic theory on conventional strong instrument would result to 
inadequacy in sampling distribution in GMM estimators and tests; see Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Moller and Stock 
(2014) 
22 Zhang, et al. {201 1) uses two lags ofM2 gap including the conventional instruments; lags of output gap and 
inflation. 
23 Satti, Malik and Saghir, (2007) also includes call money rate as instruments. 
24 Zhang, Osborn and Heon Kirn (2009) includes two lags of unemployment rates, lagged residuals; see pp. I I 
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individual cmmtries or large number of cmmtries without examining the difference in the data of 
different economies. The ClllTent study fills this gap by first demmstrating the functionality of the 
conventional, backward and hybrid/convex hybrid models on output gap-inflation equation in 
developed, emerging and developing economies. 
Following Gali, et al (2005). I examine the backward-looking type and the hybrid version 
of NKPC in these economies. I do this comparative analysis to understand the source of inflation 
persistence in each category. This allows me to empirically justify what inflation inertia enters the 
monetary policy rule and how best it can help the policy makers predict inflation in these 
economies. 
The C\llTent study also assumes that inflation equation behaves diffurently in open­
economy. This follows the thesis on Gali and Monacelli (2005). Inflation persists when there is 
huge financial and trade openness, and the international monetary policy rule a cmmtry pursues 
may substantially determine the effect of foreign macroeconomic predictors on domestic inflation. 
This study contnbutes to the growing literature by determining major inflation drivers in 
these economies and compare the significance of two output gap measures on inflation dynamics 
Only handful studies have attempted to compare different estimators in examining the 
output gap and inflation The literature is pervaded with GMM estimator. In this study, I do a 
comparative analysis on GMM, 2SLS, OLS and Bayes estimators and conch.rle which techniques 
best fit the data. Thus, this eliminates the estimator bias. Most authors that worked on comparative 
analysis, generalize on an estimator� the biasness introduced to the true parameters in these models 
can be avoided using both instrument- based and non-instrument-based techniques. 
Since GMM AND 2SLS require suitable instrmrents, I do a thorough work by evaluating 
the importance of diffurent set of instruments in each country. However, this study follows the past 
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in the choice of instnn ents. Many studies have applied convex restriction25 on the inflation inertia 
in the hybrid version of the underlying rrode� this study examines this imposition in the individual 
economy. 




3.1 Background Information on Inflation Behavior and Output Gap 
The monetary policy rule targeted by central banks is usually dictated by the desired level 
of productive inflation. In recent decades, economies have started adopting an inflation target 
that synchronizes well with economic growth, unemployment rate and conducive economic 
climates for investrrxmt. The conventional wisdom is that Inflation Targeting (11) through interest 
rate manipulation eases the too tight or too loose fuctor employment and put the economy in its 
right path. Scholars argued that growth can only be sustained in a stable targeted price leve� also 
prevents bubbles and economic fuih.rre and enhances a predictable economy. 
Since New Zealand, United Kingdom and Canada accepted this IT monetary strategy, 
several emerging and developing economies have joined the league; Krurenik, Kiem , Klyuev & 
Laxton (201 3  ). The rationale for many of these decisions by central banks is to minimize their 
loss fimction measured by output and inflation deviations from their targets, Azad & Das (2014). 
However, not all economies have adopted this principle. A strand of authors believes IT bas not 
lived up to its expectation They believe it to be a counter-productive and an anti-development 
strategy. A stream of studies also argued, except output gaps and other fundamental fuctors are 
well understood, IT would continually be a mirage. The following explicates the trend of inflation 
and output gap in the selected cotmtries. 
3.1.1 Developed Economies 
The Bank of Canada was the second, after New Zealand, to introduce inflation targeting in 
the 1 990s. Since the introduction, the IT has met with great success in monitoring and controlling 
inflation. This is evident in Canadian inflation data; see fig 5 . 1 .  The data reveal a mean-reverting 
process around the target range within those years. Though, the inflexible 2% target was not 
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achieved year in - year out, the gaps are not too wide to distort the monetary policy rule adopted 
by the Bank. The ability to close the gap between the actual market inflation with the target has 
consistently been used as an index for the Bank's performance. This goal is pursued till date. 
The Canadian output has had periods of lows and highs vis-a�vis its potential level The 
gap estimation confirms the high percentage swings away from the full employment output; see 
fig. 5 . 1 .  
Based on the sluggish growth in recent years, the Canadian output gap bas slowed down 
gravitating zero gap in past five years. Between this period inflation ranges between 2% to 4% 
over this period; see fig 5 . 1 .  How does the gap infiltrates into the inflation target pursued by the 
Bank of Canada? The Bank understands the pressure posed by output gap in distorting the inflation 
target, makes it constantly review its monetary decisions. The Bank manipulates its interest rate 
based on the direction of the pressure. Though, despite the decelerating growth, inflation has been 
predicted to move against the wind in coming years. Scotiabank comrrentary (April 2018) projects 
a pick in inflation beyond the 2% inflation target over the next two years even in a decelerating 
economic growth. 
The monetary targeting in France focuses more on quantitative easing or tightening in 
regulating the economic presstrre. The Bank of France also uses interest rate and quantity of credit 
moving· on the financial institution corridors. The France inflation reveals appealing downward 
sloping since 1980s. This monetary policy strategy has tamed the inflationary pressure in the past 
years. The persistent decline in the France inflation annmmces the underlying fuctors despite the 
non-inflation targeting pursued by the Banque de France in their monetary process. Since the year 
2009, inflation bas hardly risen past 2%, see fig. 5.2. These dynamics have spurred studies on the 
influence of output gap in the inflation equation France is one of the prominent countries in the 
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Euro Zone with three major missions; financial steadiness, service to the economy and monetary 
strategy, which must maintain a transparent and consistent monetary policy in the Euro areas. If 
these goals must be achieved, sources of inflationary pressure must be contained, and output gap 
is an important macroeconomic driver of inflation in the Euro Areas. Tiwari, et al (2014) 
swnmariz.es the policy implication of the usefulness of output gap on inflation dynamics in France 
and suggests European Currency Bank to follow suit. This evidence is revealed in the time plots; 
see fig. 5.2. 
The German inflationary pressure of the 1920s was the fustest and the greatest in the history 
of Gem1'my. Scholars recotmt the catastrophic growth in the money supply which led the German 
Mark to become worthless and by 1920, billions of Mark was jU5t worth a piece of dollar. This 
hyper-inflation was blamed on high cost of repairing the damage of the World War I and the 
imposed reparation on Germany by the Allies. However, by the end of the 1923s, Mark was 
replaced with a new Mark and various treaties were reached with allies. These developments led 
to the end of the hyperinflation in Germany. This historic economic disturbance has helped the 
• 
German goverrurent maintain a moderate inflation over the decades. 1be German inflation rate 
gravitates between 7.6% and -0.45% between 1971 to 2017; see .fig.5.3. Like the Banque de 
France, the Germany's Bundesbank plays :fim.damental role in the monetary policy formation in 
the Eurowne leaving which constrains its domestic monetary control and policymaking. The Bank 
is solely charged with inflatio.n control and stabilizing the Euro to avoid the post war experience. 
These objectives have thoroughly been pursued through the int1a tion and monetary targets with 
track record of successes in temlS of single digit inflation and economic growth. 
The German output has followed tightly its potential output, may be due to the strong 
monetary and fiscal policy influence after the post-war experience. The widest range of estimated 
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output gap is between -4% to 4%. The huge gaps are asstnred to be the aftermath of global 
economic events in 1 990s and 2008. Since 2010, the output gap gravitates towards 0%. 
The Italian economy is one of the largest in the Euro Zone with strong Imnetary infiue nee. 
1he Italian experience of stagflation between l 970-1 980s was a historic economic event that 
spurred Imnetary discretion on drastic inflation control In relative term:;, the period (commonly 
termed; Years of Lead) was marked by high inflation and output gap as shown in the fig.5.4. In 
the 1980s, Italy recorded two-digit inflation and less than -2% percentage point of output gap. This 
phenomenon called for decisive macroeconomic policy dehberation and implementation. Over the 
years, with a strong Imnetary action, the Bank of Italy was able to curb a soaring inflation in the 
1970s to less than 2% before the 2010. This was achieved through complete Bank's autonomy. 
The potential level of output was stabilized with output gap not exceeding 2% before year 2000, 
however, the gap accelerates beyond and gradually fulls below zero in the following decades. This 
was because the Italian economy has been performing poorly in recent years. The Fig 5.4 reveals 
the economy operates below its potential since 2010. 
The Japanese economy of 1970s was plagued with inflationary pressure. At the middle of 
the decade, inflation was already double digits; see fig. 5. 5. The impact of the global oil crisis and 
the rising prices in real estate that caused bubbles in the period were chiefly blrured for causing 
high inflation while there was also wide belief that the Japanese Imnetary looseness to curb the 
anti-trade yen appreciation contnbute to the messy period of inflationary crisis. As shown in the 
fig.5.5b, the inflationary pressure subsided from early 1980s as a result of the Bank of Japan' s 
defensive Imnetary policy. However, the Japanese economy has suffered economic quagmire 
since the end ofbubble in the early 1990s; termed the Japanese Lost Decades. This is reflected in 
the output gap in fig.5.5a. For a score years, the economy battled with low economic growths and 
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a deflationary pressme. 1he inflation was too low to encomage investment and productivity. In 
recent time, the economic strategies- Abenomics- pmsued by the ctn"rent Prirre Minister (Shinzo 
Abe, 2012) has reduced the low growth pressmes that have htmted the economy for years. The 
Bank of Japan was mandated to constantly revive a productive inflation to 2% and diplomatically 
manipulate Yen to boost export in the foreign trade. These strategies may be pronotmced on both 
inflation and output gap; as they have both risen above zero percent since 2015.  
The United Kingdom monetary policy is geared towards controlling gaps in both inflation 
and output level 1he economy targets 2% inflation to stimulates demands and economic growth . 
. 
The Bank of England also relies on the expected behavior of both inflation and growth in 
determining the level of interest rate that stabilizes the economy. However, in different occasions, 
the Bank has used monetary easing to rescue the economy from recessionary crisis. 1he fig. 5 . 6 
reveals the UK's crises; the mid- l 970s and the 1980s recessions reduced the actual output fur 
below its potentials. During these periods, the economy also recorded double digit inflation The 
1970s oil crises and contractionary fiscal policies were blamed for these crises. The 1 990s 
recession and global economic mehdown (2008-2009) were also two economic ttn"moil that 
explained the large gaps in the output trend of this economy. The latter crisis infiltrated into the 
economy because of the housing crisis in the United States. As a strong member of the Emopean 
Union before the referendum for the exit was passed in 2016, the Bank of England was charged 
with price and financial stability in the Emo Zone. 
The United States' economy has the highest m.nnber of recessionary periods in the workl, 
ranging from the great depression of 1 930s to the great recession of the 2008/2009. These two 
greatest economic crises show the susceptibility of the US economy to monetary slackness during 
financial panics. The latter was hugely caused by the drastic fall in housing prices in the middle of 
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the housing bubbles. Dtning these recessionary periods, the US output fulls below its potential; 
see :fig.5.7a, 1 970s, 1980s& 2008-2009s. However, starting from 2010, the economy has gradually 
been recovering from the financial meltdown. The United State rrxmetary policy has been Imre 
decisive in controlling inflationary pressure on the economy; except in the 1 980s, the annual 
inflation rose above 4% till date- see :fig.5.7b. The highest bank; The Federal Reserve, manipulates 
the red interest rate and Imney supply to achieve its goals of low unemployment, price stability 
and sustainable economic growth. The Imnetary policy system has, however, been criticized and 
blamed for causing the economic panics. The critics said that the several policy b.lurKlers by the 
Federal Reserve were the main causes of the periods ofrecession. Taylor (1980 &1990) believed 
Federal Reserve was too erratic in the policy rules and this breeds the lack of accountability and 
consistence leading to loss of public confidence. Taylor proposed a Imnetary policy rule - Taylor 
Rule- that had inflation targeting in it and believed if this was rightly followed, the recurrent 
negative gaps woukl be eliminated. More also, blamed US Imnetary policy was too fur into 
discretion than rule which is the reason the Fed was incapable to stop the crises from happening. 
3.1.2 Emerging Economies 
The Brazilian historical hyperinflation was one of the longest in the workl. At the early 
70s, the inflation started with double-digits and by 1 994 it already exploded to three-digit inflation; 
see :fig.5.8b. Since the crisis ended, the core inflation has remained stable at single-digit. During 
this period, the economy was also heated up with real output rising above its potentiai except in 
mid 1 980s. The Braznian economy performed fuirly between 1 990 to 2013 before the recessionary 
crisis set in at the wake of 2015.  The output fell consistently and till end of the 2017, the output 
remains below its potential leve� see fig.5.8a. This economic downturn was partially blamed for 
the prolonged contractionary monetary policy by the Central Bank of Brazil. 
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The Mexican financial crisis of the 1980s was significant in its economic history. The 
drastic policy changes of the 1970s through expanding fiscal base and budget led to huge public 
debt. This increase in govennnent spending resulted to short-lived economic growth and rise in 
inflation. The Mexican foreign reserve base deteriorated as result of ctll'fency appreciation caused 
by the surge in the domestic in:ffation; see fig.5.9b. To forestall stability, the Mexican central bank 
loosened its international monetary policy and allowed its currency to devalue in the mid- 1990s. 
This policy mistake led to fear of foreign investment repatriation and to further curb this problem, 
real interest was increased which suffered the domestic investm.:mt and subsequently on economic 
growth. 1he fulling in:ffation before the devaluation rose above 50% and several periods of 
recession were recorded. However, the recent Mexican output has hovered its potential level and 
in:ffation has been single digit; see fig.5.9. 
The Indian crisis is synonyrmus with the Mexican financial cnsJS. 1he huge government 
spending deficit coincided with the depleted foreign reserve and large trade deficit in 1 980s. To 
stop the crisis, the Indian monetary authority devalued its currency which further worsened the 
economic situation From this period and in 1990s, in:ffation was gravitating at double-digits; see 
fig 5 . 1  Ob. During the peak of the Indian economic crisis, the first reform on hberatio n was 
introduced to severe state control on economic regulation and to correct the dwindling balance of 
payment. With this reform and several others, the Indian output fuired until early 2000s when 
recessionary gaps reached at two digits. More also, India has experienced consistent growth 
peaking at average of I 0% output gap in 2017. The in:ffation was also stable at single-digit. 
The South Africa monetary policy inflation targeting was adopted at the wake of 2000. 
The stx:cess of this formal in:ffation targeting is slightly reflected on the economic growth. The 
output gap rose from negative during this period and hovered around zero at the end of 2017; see 
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fig 5 . 1  la. The historic inflation of the economy has also not SWllllg totally away from the 3%-6% 
target rate since the South Africa Reserve Bank joined the official list ofIT's countries. This was 
achieved by maintaining transparency in policy formulation and ensuring pragmatic process of 
implementing the policy. 
The huge spikes in the Turkish historic output gap and inflation data in the 1990s - early 
2000 was due to the growing hidden economic problem in the past decades. During these periods, 
inflation peaked at triple digits and the output gaps (in year 2001) reached its lowest than the 
periods before and after. This was blamed on the imprudent fiscal spending, total reliance of the 
Turkish economy on the foreign investirent and the political instability at the period. The Turkish 
economy battled several recession periods till 20 12, as revealed in fig 5. 12a, despite various 
stabilization m::metary and fiscal policies. However, inflation has fairly maintained at a single-digit 
till year 201 7  with a positive output gap; see fig.5.1 2a&b. 
The Chinese economy is controversially the largest economy in the world with a consistent 
economic growth. The Chinese single inflationary crisis was in 1995 and have been relatively 
stable over the years. For the past three decades, the real output gap bas also not deviated largely 
from its potential output gap; see fig. 5 . 1 3a&b. 
3.1.3 Developing Economies 
The Bangladesh economy has constantly maintained a moderate inflation and output 
growth in three decades. This came after severe economic crisis in the 1970s to 1980s; higher and 
lower percentage point of inflation, redoced economic growth and recurrent but mild recession 
and stagflation. The Bangladesh monetary policy at the wake of independence was severely 
criticized for the macroeconomic shocks to the economy during the decade. The inability of the 
monetary policy rate to address inflation was b1amed on the inflexibility that characterized the 
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Bangladesh Bank adopted interest rate. 1he rate was cowrterproductive such that it caused 
disincentive to save and subsequently Jack of investment fimd. In the 1 990s, the regulated interest 
rate gave way to market based rate and has since helped rmderate the output growth and inflation 
rate; see fig 5.14. 
1he Egypt's central bank is one of the recent banks adjusting their rronetary policy to 
inflation targeting. This was to stabilize swings in the general price level in the country. The 
Egypt's intermittent economic crises since 1 960s has had great effects on the economic 
perfonnances and living standard. 1he inflation sank deep to below 2% at the early 1 980s and 
before the first half of the decade, the inflation was peaked at 30%. In 1990s, inflation was at 
double digits and before the advent of Arab Spring- the Egyptian Revolution of201 1 - was already 
down below l %; see fig. 5 . 1 5 .  Scholars recount that the Egypt' s-20 1 1  crisis affected the core poor 
than evidence shown on the aggregate income as revealed in statistics. 1he food price inflation 
rises above the core inflation and there is wide gap between the output per person than the overall 
output gap as revealed in fig 5.1  Sa. 
1he Ghanaian historic surge in inflation was between 1970 to 1980; see fig.5. 16b. The 
period records a gradual rise of inflation rate from single digit at the beginning of 1970 to a triple 
digit before the first half of 1980s. During this poor economic episode, the real output swung 
around its potential and dived to negative output gap before 1985. This was consequent on fiscal 
and IDJnetary indiscipline. 1he govemtrent booget deficit and rroney growth increased abruptly 
losing control over inflation. Despite variant of rmnetary stabilization policy, inflation still 
hovered around double-digit till end of 20 1 7  and past policy mistake still hunts the perfonnance 
of the economy. More also, the potential output has been difficult to maintained. The output gap 
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predicted showed a long-term recession from mid- l 980s to the 2010, however, expansion began 
2013; see fig.5. l 6a. 
The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 was a catastrophic economic and social event in 
the history of Indonesia. This period witnessed a sharp economic downtwn coupled with social 
tmrest. 1be financial problem starting in Thai quickly eroded the Indonesia economy due to lack 
of central bank control of financial sector and the absence of deliberate IDJnetary policies 
governing the flow of tmney into the economy. The crisis hit the very fubrics of this vu.Iner ab le 
economic structure and spread like a wild fire to the social thinking of the incwnbent governme nt 
at the ti:rre. Thus, led to many people losing their lives in a fierce riot against the government. 
During this period, a fuir stagnating double-digit before the crises went over above 70% and a 
bubbling economy went into recession reaching well below -5% output gap (fig. 5 . 1 7). Several 
other fuctors, such as International Monetary Fund bail-out terms and condition, and initial fuilure 
of the incumbent government to relinquish power, were blamed for the severe nature of the 1997 
financial crisis in Indonesia in relative to other economies in the region. However, the Indonesian 
authorities learnt a lesson dming this economic crisis and made them put in place structures 
resistant to the external shocks. As indicated in fig. 5 .l  7a, the output gap has consistently risen 
and out of recession for the past six years. 
The Kenyan economy has had repeated episodes of mild double-digit inflation since 1970s. 
The 1970s of high inflation was severely blamed on the external fuctors, such as the surge in the 
global price of oil leading to the economy to phmge into recession as fuctor prices increases; see 
fig. 5 .l  8a. The second of episode of recession was in early 1980s partly resulting from unstable 
oil price, reduced export revenue and financial crunch in Kenya. However, inflation was relative 
stable compared to the previous episode. The historic stagflation episode was in the early 1 990s 
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when inflation rose above 40% and output full below its potential The output gap is predicted to 
be below 2.5% point of the zero-baseline gap. The Kenyan output was below its potential since 
the 1990s until 2013 but with moderate inflation rate, except for few cases of inflation crises 
(fig.5.18b). 
The Nigerian inflation has gravitated double-digit since the mid-l 970s. The inflation rate 
peaked at triple-digits in 1995 and in 2010. The economy also battled with episodic recessionary 
periods. The Nigerian economy boo�d in the 1970s and early 1 980s due to oil discovery and 
exploration This resuhed to increased government revenue and spending in form of fiscal 
imbalances and indiscip line during the short-lived oil boom This imprudence was also coupled 
with neglect of the core sectors of the economy. More also, till date, the government budget is 
benclnmrked on global oil prices. In the late 1 980s, the economy was struck with sharp decline in 
oil revenue leaving governrrent in desperate condition for budget fimding. This economic 
condition informed the government to lunch a Structural Adjusurent Program (SAP). This was 
mandated for IMF loan Coupled with the political instability and high level of corruption in the 
comtry, inflation became tmpredictable swinging high and low, and growth could not be 
maintained. Before the end of the 1 990s, gaps reached its ever-lowest point; see fig.5.19a. This 
made the critics confronted Central Bank rmnetary policy on their inability to regulate inflation in 
the economy. However, starting from 201 1 ,  Nigerian inflation has remained stable at single-digit 
and the real output has been growing at averagely 6%. 
The Pakistani inflation has behaved more erratically since mid-l 970s, although, relative ly 
single to mild double-digit inflation. The Pakistan crises (trade deficit, sanctions for nuclear test, 
political instability and fiscal deficit) of the late 1 990s contributed to the later surge in the inflation 
rate, short-full of the potential output and other damaging consequences on the macroeconomic 
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fundamentals during the period. Between 2000-2010, the inflation unsteadily swung in the double­
digit zone and the output gap rroved cyclically around the zero region In past three years, the 
inflation bas steadily maintained the targeted range and in the past four years, the output bas been 
out of its recession; see fig.5.20a&b. 
• 
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4.0 Methodology and Data 
CHAPTER FOUR 
This chapter discusses the rrodels for achieving the study's objectives. The rrethods of 
estimation and their justfficatiorn in the ctDTent study are briefly laid down in the first section of 
this chapter, the research data, the sources, rreasurerrent and selected colllltries are highlighted in 
the secorxl section in the chapter. The study's empirics proceed by highlighting four distinct 
structural rrodels, estimate the output gaps with two fundarrental approaches, identify the potential 
endogenous regressors, select relevant inst:rurrents to separate the endogeneity from the structural 
roode� check the rrean-reversion of the tirre-series data, corntruct the titre-plots for inflation and 
the two output gaps, estimate the structural rrodels with four econorretric techniques and conduct 
the post-estimation on the structural rrodels. 
4.1 Methodology 
The ell1'iric fuilure of the traditional output gap-inflation dynamics rrodel to fit time-series 
data have stimulated thorough investigation into the rrodel reformulation. In the literature, I 
highlight the contradicting finding.5 as to whether ctDTent inflation responds significantly to output 
gap, future inflation, past inflation and external factors or not; see Gali et al (1 999 &2001 ), Rudd 
et al (2005) and Zhang et al (2009). 
The lacking empiric resolution calls for rrodel restructuring and the CtDTent study proceeds 
by introducing external variables to different rrodels' categories contrary to the Gali et al (2005) 
of small open economy type model which focuses only on hybrid rrodel Therefore, the foreign 
interaction and disturbances justify the inclusion of trade and real exchange rate in all versiorn of 
the rrodel 
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This section discusses the four models used in generating resuhs for selected economies. 
1he forward-looking, the backward-looking, the hybrid and the convex restricted type of models. 
The current study also differs, from here, distinctively, by which no past studies or literature is 
scarce, on comparative analyses of these open economy models in different economy categories 
in a single research paper. 
4.1.1 Forward Looking Model 
Tue forward-looking type, referred to be the baseline, predicts inflation to be forward 
looking. That is, inflation expectation determines the current inflation. 1be underlying assmnption 
is that a group of agents that could review their prices at time, t, does that by focusing on the prices 
that is predicted to reign in the future, t+ I .  The output gap coefficient in the mode� commonly 
referred to as the slope par�ter and clearly determined by the level of price stickiness in the 
economy, affects the inflation at time t, and both trade and real exchange rates exact pressure on 
the dorrestic inflation. The open economy forward looking model is given by 
4.1 
rrt is the current dorrestic inflation rate, Et rrt+ 1 is the expected inflation for period t+ 1 ;  
this is simply captured by lead inflation, y* tdenotes the output gap for both HP and Kalman, rert 
is the real exchange rate, trt captures trade openness and et is the error term in the forward-
looking structural model Both expected inflation and output gap are presumably endogenous, and 
the elimination process of the endogeneity is highlighted in the sections below. In order not to 
over-instrument the process of elimination, interest rate, two lags of output gap, real exchange 
rates and trades are used. The a priori for expected inflation and output gap are 82 > 0 and y > 0. 
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Both real exchange rate and trade pararreters are expected to have a sizable magnitude and either 
signs are allowed based on the inflation responses to the external factors. 1bat is, <p > 0 OT < 0 
and T > 0 OT < 0. 
4.1.2 Backward Looking Model 
The backward-looking model demonstrates inflation persistence. 1bat is, ctnTent inflation 
exhibits som:: past inflation information. The theoretical justification is that agents constantly 
examme the previous inflation behavior, at t- 1 ,  in setting their prices for the CtnTent period, usually 
at the beginning of the trading year. Like the forward-looking mode� output gap is the slope 
param::ter driving the changes in the inflation rate. The real exchange rate and trade openness also 
enter the dom::stic inflation equation. The open economy backward looking model is given by 
4.2 
nt is the ctnTent dom::stic inflation rate, rrt-l is the lagged inflation for period t-1, y* t 
shows the output gap for both HP and Kahnan, rert is the real exchange rate, trt captures trade 
openness and Et is the error term in the backward-looking structural model The process of the 
endogeneity elimination in the inflation and the output gap data would be discussed in the 
following section. The model follows the model 4.1 in the instnn ent selection. The a priori for 
lag inflation and output gap are 81 > 0 and y > 0. Both real exchange rate and trade param::ters 
are expected to have a sizable magnitude and either signs are accommodated based on the inflation 
responses to the external fuctors. 1bat is, <p > 0 OT < 0 and T > 0 OT < 0. 
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4.1.3 Hybrid Model 
The research papers of Gali et al ( 1999 & 200 1)  were first credited for the close economy 
type of hybrid roodel This was, however, extended to a small open economy in the Gali et al 
(2005) and followed by Abba et al (20 1 1 )  and Abba et al (2016). This version of the rrodel 
includes both expected inflation and lag inflation alongside the output gap, real exchange rate and 
trade. The fonrer rationalizes the importance of both past and present inflation in the clllTent 
inflation behavior in United States. The latter was carried out on Australian data. The clllTent study 
contributes to this investigation, not only in developed colllltries, but also in emerging and 
developing economies. This is due to influence of globalization on inflation dynamics in these 
other set of economies in recent decades. The hybrid rrodel is given by 
4.3 
rrt is the clllTent domestic inflation rate, rrt-i is the lag inflation for period t-1 Etrrt+i is 
the expected inflation for period t+ 1 ,  y* t shows the output gap for both HP and Kalman, rert is 
the real exchange rate, trt captures trade openness and ( t is the error term in the hybrid structural 
rrodel The a priori(s) are the same with the above two tmdels. 
4.1.4 Convex Restricted Hybrid Model 
This fotrrt:h structural tmdel restricts the swn ofthe discotmt factors (lead and lag inflation 
parameters) in the hybrid rrodel to be one. This imposition is not new in body of literature but 
what separates this study is that it is first to test this convex restriction across twenty colllltries in 
different economy categories. In this rrode� the study investigates variation in the lag inflation 
parameter as resuh of imposing restriction on our hybrid structural rrodel. 
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4.4 
rr* t is the ctnTent but transfonred domestic inflation rate, rr· t-i is the restricted lag 
inflation for period t- 1 ,  y* t shows the output gap for both HP and Kahnan, rert is the real 
exchange, trt captures trade openness and {}t is the error term in the hybrid structural rnodel The 
a priori( s) are the same with the above two rrodels. 
Though, the structural rnodels are well knitted above with the several fundamrntal 
variables, the output gap is an llllObserved data. The following sub-section discusses the derivation 
of the variables in the CtnTent study. 
4.1.4 Output Gaps Estimation 
In recent decades, output gap has become a pararoount indicator for �auging the level of 
desired inflation and other macroeconomic indicators in the monetary discretion Also, in fiscal 
dehberation, output gap is influential in synchronizing the governrrent spending to the level of 
economic perfonnance. Osman et al (2010) alludes that output gap is a crucial tool for estimating 
cyclical budget balances. Hence, this important variable is llllObservable. ln the ctnTent study, two 
measures of output gap are used; the Hodrick Prescott (tm.ivariate) and the Kahnan (muhi variate) 
filtering. The fonrer relies heavily on statistical methodology without including economic 
infonration in the estimation process while the later incorporates other fimdarrental economic 
variables in its measure. The subsections below lay out the rnodels for both measures. 
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4.1.4.1 Hodrick Prescott (HP) Filtering 
The HP procedure is used for data decomposition. That is, separating the cyclical 
component in a tirre-series data. This treasure is simple and easy, however, criticized for been 
purely statistical. In the study, HP is used to rermve the cyclical composition in the real gross 
domestic product of the irxlividual cmmtries. First, the procedure generates the trend component 
of the real GDP; the potential output, with a suitable multiplier, A. =  1600, as suggested in verse 
literature. Second, the potential output, estimated by HP, is subtracted from the actual real GDP. 
The Yt represents the log of the real GDP, rt denotes the estirmted potential output in log form 
and the y•hp is HP output gap estimate. The model is given as: 
4.1.4.2 
T T 
minTt cICYt - rt)2 + A I{(rt+l - rt) - (rt - rt-1)}2 
t=l t=l 
Y•hp = y -r t - •t 
Kalman Filtering 
4.5 
Kahnan filtering in economic analysis is a multivariate approach, and in output gap 
estirmtion, it integrates macroeconomic infonnation into output gap estimates. However, this 
treasure is subjective based on the researcher's discretion about the relevance of the variable 
choice. In the current study, the variables used are the lag one of real interest rate and real exchange 
rate and the � of export (proxy the foreign demand). The conventional belief is that real interest 
rate moderates the pressure on the real gross dorrestic by determining the level of gap in the 
economy and both real exchange rate and export rmunt pressure from the external on the economy. 
1be model is set as: 
4.6 
38 
y• denotes the estimated output gap, rirt-l represents real interest rate at first lag, rert-l 
represents real exchange rate at first lag, expt represents current export, <p1 , <p2, & <p3 are the 
par�ters and t9t is the error tenn After estimation, the predicted estimates show the Kahnan 
estimate of output gap. 
More also, the structural roodels laid out in the above sub-sections ( 4. 1 . 1 -4.1 .4) probably 
contain some element of endogeneity. The following highlight procedures for eliminating this 
problem in the structural rrodel 
4.1.5 Endogeneity Regressors 
The study presurres the presence of endogeneity in the structural m>dels (eq. 4.1 -4). The 
output gap and the inflation are suspected to correlate with the error tenns in each of the set-out 
models. The reason is; the output gap is controlled by some external shocks (rronetary expansion, 
fiscal base, :financial crisis, labor market frictions) which are contained in the white noise. The 
influence of price expectation a00 foreign pressure might spur excess demand on the real output 
driving output gap beyond the reasonable extent. Several of these variables are summarized in the 
residual ternl.5. This renders output gap endogenous regressor in the structural roodel 
More also, both lag and expected inflation are preswnably endogenous regressors. Agent 
form expectation based on the past and current available information. This information is already 
synchronized in the contemporaneous error terms. This condition may render the expected 
inflation completely endogenous. The lag inflation is the previous past inflation with an existing 
noise. These statistical deficiencies in the predictor variables call for relevant and valid 
instruments-based estimation techniques. 
39 
However, the choice of suitable instruments is another topical debate in the output gap­
inflation estimation, see chapter two. 1bis was because wrong choice of instruments complicates 
the existing endogeneity problerrn and leads to inefficient results. 1bis study partly followed 
literature in instrumenting the structural rmdels and iterates different instrument choices. After 
rehearsing these instruments on the endogenous regressors, the study concludes on the level and 
the first lag of real interest rate, and first and second lag5 of output gap, trades, real exchange 
rate. 1be :rrodels are given below. 
4.1.5.1 Endogeneity Removal from Output Gap 
y * t represents the estimated exogenous output gap, rir and rir t-l denote the level and 
lag 1 of real interest rates, y* t- l  and y* t-2 represent lag 1 and 2 of the output gap, 
rert-l and rert_2 represent lag 1 and 2 of real exchange rate, trt-l and trt-z represent lag 1 
and 2 of trade and p1 - Pa are the parameters. The output gap follows autoregressive up to lag 
two. Both trade and real exchange rate explains the gap from external and real interest rate explains 
gap from internal 
4.1.5.2 Endogeneity Removal from Expected Inflation 
rrt+l = 01 rir + 02 rir t-l + 03rert_1 + 04rert-z + 05 trt-l + 06 trt_2 4.8 
rrt+l represents the exogenous expected inflation, rir and rir t-l denote the level and 
lag 1 of real interest rates, rert-i and rert-z represent lag I and 2 of real exchange rate, 
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trt-l and trt_2 represent lag 1 and 2 of trade and 01 - 08 are the param:!ters. Both trade and real 
exchange rate explain the expected inflation from outside and real interest rate explains it from 
within. 
4.1.5.3 Endogeneity Removal from Lag and Convex Restricted Inflation 
rrt-l represents the estimated exogenous output gap, rir and rir t-l denote the level and 
lag I of real interest rates, rert-l and rert_2 represent lag I and 2 of real exchange rate, 
trt-i and trt_2 represent lag I and 2 of trade and a1 - a8 are the parameters. Both trade and real 
exchange rate explain the lag inflation from outside and real interest rate explains it from within. 
This applies to the convex restricted lag inflation model 
4.1.6 Estimation Techniques 
The study adopts four estimators ( i.e, the HAC-robust Generalized Method of Moment, 
the Two Stage Least Square, Ordinary Least Square and the Bayes). The study applies two of 
these methods to address the problem of endogeneity in the regressors as shown in the sections 
above. GMM estimator bas often been helpful in economic analysis because of its resultant 
characteristics of the parameters; it is asymptotically normai efficient and consistent compared to 
other estimators. This method has severally been used because of likelihood of endogeneity in the 
time-series modelling. The prominent and similar studies, such as Gali et al (200 1 )  and Rudd et 
al (2005) and Abbas et al (201 1),  have also used GMM in carrying out their empirical analysis. 
Mavroedis et al (2014) alludes that GMM is a weak identification robust method. 
41 
The two-stage least square is profound in endogeneity elimination. It is called instrwrental 
variable technique and known for cleaning up endogeneity in the regressors. This study relies on 
this technique and the GMM for the above stated statistical problem in the predictor variables. The 
application of Bayes is numerous in economic analysis; however, t11i5 study focuses on the post-
estimation tests of Bayesian analysis. The statistical derivations of these technKtues are beyond the 
scope of the CWTent study, nonetheless, highlights some details about the techniques. 
4.1.6.1 Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
The GMM uses set of moment conditions which are domain of the data and the statistic(s). 
The GMM then minimizes the arithmetic means of the moment conditions. The goal ofthis method 
is to find the most efficient, consistent and asymptotically normal pararreter in a distnbution of 
pararreters. The GMM estimator is consistent because it provides an estimate that closely 
approximates to the true pararreter. The GMM estimator is asymptotically normal because it 
provides finite range within which the estimate lies. Within this range, the GMM selects the 
efficient parameter that has the smallest variance. 
More also, the desirability of this estimator is tested by the Hasen's J statistics. This statistic 
reveals whether the model is overidentified or not; better still, tests if the fi.mctional model 
appropriately fits the data. The GMM model is overidentified when there are too many moment 
conditions than the number of pararreters in the modei mostly caused by endogenous instrwre nts. 
If we rail to reject the Hasen's J hypothesis ( ie, the model is not overidentified), then the model 
meets the restrictions and the choice of the instruments are not correlated with the error team. 
Otherwise, the model is overidentified and gives rise to incorrect parameters. This is one of the 
major problerm of the GMM which might result from a very weak set of instruments. 
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4.1.6.2 Two Stage Least Square 
The two-stage estimation technique JS variant of instrumental variable method of 
estimation, often used for eliminating endogeneity. The time-series regressor in a model can 
become endogenous when there is simultaneous causality, omitted variable bias, sample selection 
bias, error -in -variable bias and multi-collinearity problem in the specified model 
The existence of a covariance between a regressor and the error term may render the 
estimation incorJSistent, thus requires a set of instruments to remove the part of error term present 
in the endogenous regressors in the first stage regression The estimated series is further transferred 
to the structural model to replace the original explanatory variable that correlates with the error 
terms. This technique's strength and weakness depend on the choice of instruments. 
For a robust estimation, the instrument used must fulfil two procedural conditions; 
relevance and exogeneity. Exogeneity, when the white noise in the structural model is llllCOrrelated 
with instrument; Relevance, when the instrument is highly correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. However, a very weak instrument may further complicate the process. 
The test for strength of the selected instrument is widely carried out by Sargan-Hansen test 
of overidentifying restriction and it is hypothesized as: ''Instrument is completely exogenous". 
Failing to reject this hypothesis demonstrates a strong instrument, otherwise, the instrument is 
weak and probably correlates with the error term In the current study, both Hansen and Sargan 
are used for post estimation test of instrument strength and structural model desirability. 
4.1.6.3 Bayes 
The Bayesian analysis uses the prior distnbution and the probability (likelihood) of a 
parameter based on the data observed to generate a posterior distribution The prior distnbution 
are subjective parameters predicted ahead of collecting data and the posterior distnbution are 
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estimated parameters based on the prior and the observed data. Recently, the Bayesian Inferences 
in the field of Economics has proffered sohrtion to questions on the impact of rmst recent 
information- data on the existing rmdel The cmrent study uses data spans from 1971 -201 7 and 
simply uses conventional priors of 0.5 for lag inflation, expected inflation, trade and real exchange 
rate and 0.7 for the output gap. Most importantly, the Bayes post-estimation tests are used for 
examining the rmdel desirability. These tests check, if the rrodel adapts well with data, the 
existence of serial correlation, the normality test. The posterior parameters are very sensitive to 
the supplied priors. This raises a caveat in the depbying this technique for estimation. 
4.2 The Data and Source 
The data and the somce are briefly discussed in the bebw sections 
4.2.1 The Data 
The data used for the analysis spans from 1 971 to 2017. The variables and definitions are 
briefly discussed in the folbwing. 
Real Gross Domestic Products (GDP) strrns all residents' gross value added, and taxes and 
deduct subsidies included in the products. These are meastrred in constant 20 I 0 U.S dollars using 
2010 official exchange rate, (World Bank and OECD National Account). 
Inflation is meastrred by constnner price index estimated by annual change in the cost of 
basket of goods and service constnned by average households in year, (World Bank, IMF and IFS). 
Real interest rate is measmed by GDP-deflater adjusted lerxiing interest rate. This is 
estimated by subtracting inflation from the nominal interest rates in the economy, (World Bank, 
FRED and IFS). 
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Real effective exchange rate is inflation adjusted nominal efrective rate (NER). NER is 
weighted average of dorrestic ctrrrency against other foreign ctrrrencies, (Workl Bank, IMF and 
IFS). 
Trade is estirmted as share of swn of export and import of goods and service in gross 
dorrestic product, (Workl Bank national accotmt and OECD). The annual percentage change 
(growth) of trade is used. 
Exports consist of value of all goods and services so kl to other cotmtries of the world. The 
annual percentage change (annual growth) of the exports is calculated from constant 2010 U.S 
dollar's value of export of individual cotmtries, (world Bank and OECD national accotmts). 
4.2.2 Selected Economies 
Twenty cotmtries are carefully seJected for the sttrly. The rationale for these seJected 
cotmtries was: First, literature is scarce on the empirical analysis on the inflation-output gap nexus 
in the selected errerging and developing cotmtries. Second, there is empirical conflict in findings 
of these relationship in the selected developed cotmtries. Third, we fotmd the required data for 
these selected cow'ltries. The justification for selecting these different economic categories was: 
First, was to expose these economies to different versions of structtn"al models and record their 
responses for policy suggestion Second, was to confirm the application of these models in the 
monetary policy process in these cotmtries; mostly in the errerging and developing economies. 
Last, was to make generalization on the data-rnodel adaptability based on different economy 
categories. The cotmtries are as follow. the developed economies: Canada, France, Genmny, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom, United States. The errerging economies: Brazil, India, Mexico, South 




5.0 Discussion of Results and Policy Implication 
This chapter discusses the empirical results and the policy implications of my findings. The 
estimation procedures follow the developed rrethodology in the previous chapter. 1be empirics 
start by estimating the Sl.ll1111liry statistics of the data (table 5.1  - 5.20), estimate, graph and discuss 
both Hodrick Prescott and Kamm output gap (fig.5. l a  - 5.20b, table 5.21), conduct Augrrented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test of unit root on individual data set (table 5.22), draw up correlation 
matrices of the reskluals from the structural rmdels and the perceived endogenous regressors (table 
5.23 - 5.28) for endogeneity test in the first sub-section Second, the structural models are 
estimated, results' findings are discussed for the two rrethods of output gap and (table 5.29-5.40) 
and the post-estimation (table 5.41) are briefly explained. Last, the study enurrerates the policy 
implications of the findings in each categories of the economies. 
5.1.0 Summary Statistics 
1be descriptive statistics (table 5. 1)  ofthe inflation data for the developed counties reveal 
inflation averaged at a single-digit over the considered period. 1be rrean averages of the Canadian 
and the French inflation revolve around 4%, the Japanese and German inflation were at 2.5% and 
3.5% respectively and the United Kingdom and Italy took the lead; average above 5% each. The 
Jarque -Bera (JB) statistics for all the countries are sizably high and the p-values are less than the 
adopted standard level of signifJCance (a=5%). Thus, the inflation data of these set of countries are 
not normal 
The rrean average of the inflation data (table 5.2) in the emerging countries are relative ly 
high; between economies' categories and within the category. Brazilian inflation data averaged at 
48% for the sample data. This statistic is not surprising for an economy that battled a historic 
46 
hyper-inflation The Turkish inflation takes the second highest average at approximately 39%. The 
Turkish economy, at some point, had an episodic triple-digit inflation which overweighs the series 
of lower inflation periods. The Mexican inflation average takes the third position with 24%. This 
inflation is still quite high for a sizable 47 data points. The South African mean inflation was 
roughly 1 1  %. The Chinese and the Indian inflation means are both single-digit; the fonner has 4% 
and the latter has 7%. The major reason for this huge difference in the inflation averages when 
compared to the developed economies was that the economic crises in the emerging economies 
are more likely to be severe and the lack of timely fiscal and monetary measures to remedy the 
catastrophic economic condition. However, the lower averages displayed by China and India could 
be because of the differential in the severity of the economic plagues within the group. The JB 
statistics indicate only inflation data of India and South Africa are asymptotic normal while other 
economies are not nonnal 
The inflation averages (table 5.3) for the developing colllltries are considerably fair. The 
Pakistani and Kenyan inflation means (9.8% and 9.98%) are the lowest; narrowly escaped double ­
digit. The average for Bangladesh and Egypt were roughly 10% each. The two neighboring 
economies (Nigeria and Ghana) have sizable double-digit averages with Ghana taking the lead at 
3 1  % and Nigeria; 20% while the Indonesian inflation average stands at 13%. 
Comparing the inflation statistics across categories, the developing economies' inflation 
were relatively stable than the emerging economies but less stable than the developed economies 
based on the averages and standard deviation The surrnnary statistics of the inflation data for the 
developed economies show that zero percent of a titre when standard deviation is higher than the 
mean average. The emerging economies show that 50% of a time when standard deviation is 
greater than the mean and the developing economies show 33.33% of a time when the standard 
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deviation is greater than the mean average. This conclusion is based on frequency of deviation of 
the individual data point from their rneans but does not take cognizance of the extrerne outliers 
that causes average spread to be way higher than normal 
1be surmnary statistics of Hodrick Prescott gap (table 5.4) estimation for the developed 
economies reveal that the CO\ll tries have been rrore into recessiom than expansion or a steady 
state, i.e., the titres of recession outweighs the expansions. 1be average mean for Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States are negative while both Canada and France are positive 
averages. The imximum and the minimum for these data range between 3% to -5% for Canada, 
4% to -3% for France , 4% to -4% for Germany, 5% to - 4%, for Italy, 7% to -5% for Japan, 8% 
to - 5% for United Kingdom and 6% to -6% for United States. These ranges balance out causing 
the average mean to approximately close to zero. This is evident in the JB statistics with higher p­
values; as all the HP-gap distnbutions in this group are asymptotic nonnaL As revealed in the fig 
5 . 1 -5. 7, the business cycles are rrore rapid in the developed cotmtries. The data are not stable 
because the result shows that 100% of a tiJre output gap disperses far away from its mean across 
all co\llltries in this category. 
The Kahnan gap fihering descriptive (table 5.7) confirrm the pattern exhibited by the HP. 
1be statistics reiterate the explanation on the sample balancing as the normality behavior of the 
distnbution was ascertained at the starxlard level of significance. However, there is slight 
diflerence in the maximum, minimum and the reported JB. The Kahnan estimation shows a fuir 
stability relative to the HP. 
The HP gap distnbutions (table 5.5) for the emerging economies show the expansion 
episodes outweigh the recessionary crises within the sample periods. The means of the 
di5tnbutiom are all positive. Chinese economy averages at 13%. The fig 5. 13a graphically gives a 
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clue; the Chinese has barely experienced recession in the past 40 years. Its gap peaked at 130% 
and only fell at roughly - 1 5%. The other economies' HP gap means in the group gravitate arotllld 
zero gap, except in India with 1 . 1  % average gaps. The maximum and minimum of the four of the 
economies show a closely syrmnetric ranges while Mexico and China likely look roore 
asymrretric. The JB statistics confirms tlIB supposition; only Mexican and Chinese HP gap fail 
the normality test having a very low probability value. However, using standard deviations of the 
distnbutions, none of the economies has a stable output gap measmed by HP. 
The statistic (mean; table 5.8) of the Kalman estimation of output gap for the emerging 
economies closely follow the HP except in the Turkish economy. The latter economy average was 
positive value in the HP gap while it is negative under Kahnan The sarre pattern of syrrmetric 
ranges and JB resuhs are observed as the HP. The distributions are not al5o stable. 
The output gap distnbutions of the developed economies perform better than the errerging 
economies measured by the highlighted statistics, however, has certain similar characteristic. First, 
the fonrer has smaller ranges than the latter which shows that actual outputs do not widely disperse 
from its potentia� in a relative change but not in dollar arnotmts. Second, the means of the gaps 
for the developed economies are closer to zero than the emerging economies, even when we factor 
out Chinese with extreme means in these two groups. Third, the distnbutions for the developed 
economies are rrore stable; tlIB is measured by coefficient of variation which gives a clearer 
picture of how fur the individual observation in the distnbution disperses from its mean Last, the 
developed economies pass the JB test 100% of a tirre while the emerging only did at 66.66% of a 
titre. The two groups are similar in that they not stable within 
The developing economies' gaps statistics are reported in the table 5.6 and table 5.9 . The 
means of the distnbutions are close to zeros. The HP gap (table 5.6), Bangladesh has -0.04%, 
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Egypt; 0.06%, Ghana; 0.08%, Indonesia; 0.39%, Kenya; 0.38%, Nigeria; 0.17% and Pakistan; 
0.05%. The ranges are widely asymrretric, and the distnbutions look unstable. The JB reveals that 
only Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria have normal distnbution The Kahnan gap (table 5.9) 
has the HP's highlighted statistics in common 
The gaps distnbutions for the developing economies share so� basic featmes but also 
differs with other groups. The gaps' distnbutions for the developing economies nearly balance out; 
i.e, periods of recession and expamion ahnost equilibrate the actual outputs to its potential in the 
entire bU5iness cycle. This is a replica of the developed economies. lbough, this has no economic 
significance. The distnbutions for all the groups fuil stability test. However, the stability fuirs well 
in the developing economies than e�rging but less stable than the developed. For normality test, 
1 00%, 66.67% and 57% of the economies are oorrnally distnbuted for developed, errerging and 
developing economies respectively. 
The trade growth in the developed economies revolves around 3% to 5.2% (table 5 . 1 0) 
within the sample period. The United States has the highest at 5.2% and peaked at 25% (year 1974) 
in the entire period. The Japanese, in the s� year with United States, has the highest of trade 
growth in its historic trade but also suffered negative of -32% (year 2009); that was the second 
titre the economy would decline by negative double-digits before 2016. The trade growth ofltaly 
(26%) and France (28%) also peaked in 1 974. This period was marked with trade expansion 
am:mg the developed economies resuhing from the collapse of international monetary system that 
caU5ed price changes (Wor1d Economic Swvey, 1 974). The effect of the trade boom also spread 
till 1975 when United Kingdom trade had its rmximum trade growth. Both Canada and Gennany 
at different time periods. All these economies suffer drastic trade declines at so� points and in 
so 
recent years trade growths have been dragging in these economies. 1be JB reverus that only the 
trade growth of Canada, Italy and United Kingdom pass the normality test. 
1be episodes of trade growth for the emerging economies ca.ire after their col.ll11erparts m 
the western world. 1be Chinese trade average takes the lead at 14% (table 5. 1 1) and maxed at 49% 
in 1973. 1be Turkish trade was the second with 9.5% and maxed at 83% in 1980. 1be Indian and 
Mexican trade average were the third and fourth in the trail at 9.7% and 7%, peaked at 32% (2004) 
and 41  % (1 996) respectively. The Brazilian and South African trade averages were the least in the 
group and maxed at 36% and 24% respectively. The trade perfonmnce of this group reflects their 
convergence to the developed economies. This was because these economies have improved on 
world tradeable goods over the decades. 1be statistics reveal that Brazil with the second lowest 
average surpasses the US trade average in the developed economies, which was the highest ·in its 
group. More also, Turkey, with the highest rraximum in emerging economies, was rmre than twice 
of the highest (Japan) in the developed economies. Scanning through the distnbutions in two 
groups, the episodes of higher trade growth in the emerging is fur rmre than the developed 
economies. 
The trade performance of the developing economies rmdelled after the emergmg 
economies. 1be averages (table 5 . 12) are closely related to the former. These economies have the 
highest peaks. The highest is Bangladesh; 1 1 5% and the lowest is Kenya; 38%. A caveat is 
warranted here; trade figures in the developing economies are usually dominated by imports. This 
makes these economies rmre susceptrble to the external shocks. In the current study, suffice to 
assume that higher imports in the trade may cause price destabilization in the foreign cmmtries to 
influence the prices in these countries. This same conclusion cannot be ascertained for the 
emerging economies since they have performed better in tradeable goods of higher values 
51 
compared to the developing economies which solely rely on natural resotll'ce and agricultural 
product exports. However, the statistics clearly reveal the economies in this group are m:>re open 
to external world. 
The statistics on real effective exchange rate in growth tenllS (table 5.13) soow that the 
historical ctll'rency appreciation and depreciation reflect small changes, on average, with US dollar. 
US dollar exchange rate is rreasured against Elll'o. The Canadian dollar, French (Elll'o) and the 
German (Euro), on average, strengthened against US dollar while Japanese Yen, Italian (Elll'o) and 
UK pounds depreciated against US dollar in the entire sample. The distnbutions, however, reveal 
there are periods when each of those currencies strengthen against and weaken for US dollars. First 
decade in this sample shows Canadian dollar was appreciating and there was several ahernating 
strengthening of the Elll'o against US dollar. The period of 2001 to 201 0  also records an episodic 
appreciation of Yen against US dollar. US dollar records continuous rise against Elll'o for nine 
consecutive years in the previous decade. The distnbutions are normal except France and Italy. 
The rreans (table 5.14) of the exchange rates for the errerging economies show these 
cotmtry currencies straightened against US dollars on average within the sample period, except the 
Mexican Peso. The distributions also reveal episodes of depreciation and appreciation during the 
sample periods. The Chinese Renminbi strengthened against US dollar till the half of the 1 990s 
from the beginning of the sample. The Tlll'kish Lira shows ahernating rise and full and has been 
maintained war chest against US dollar in past five years. South African Rand strengthened against 
US dollar from the beginning of this decade until last two years. The Brazilian Real had 1 0  years 
of appreciation against in the 1 970s. Indian Rupee also had I 0 years of appreciation between mid -
1 980s to mid- 1 990s. The Mexican Peso had seven-year consecutive appreciation in the past 
decade. The economic implication of these periods of changes presmmbly worsen trade and lead 
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to incident of depreciation in the subsequent years. 1be effuct of speculations may also exacerbate 
the initial currency appreciation since the financial systems of these economies are yet to develop. 
The data confirms this preposition 1be JB show the distnbutions are asyrrnretrical except South 
African Rand. 
1be means (table 5 . 15) of the real exchange growth in the developing behave quite 
differently from the emerging economies. 1be group suffers several years of currency depreciation 
in the world market. The average of the changes stands between 5% to 32% and the range between 
-21 % to 307% among the economies in the entire sample. lbese statistics are not strrprising for 
economies solely depending on exports of raw products and heavy import of diverse of foreign 
sophisticated products. For a slight change in price in the imported products, irnrred ia tel y 
synchronize into the exchange rate and domestic prices. Most of these economies lack tradeable 
goods and financial derivatives that can butter the effuct of the changes in exchange rate. The 
distnbutions reveal few cases of episode of appreciation which only lasts for few years. The JB 
statistics show none of the distribution was normal 
5.1.1 Hodrick Prescott (HP) and Kalman Output Gap 
The gaps along the business cycle of the selected economies are filtered using HP and the 
Kalman estimation technX}ues. As discussed in the previous chapters, literatlll'e bas highlighted 
the sensitivity of inflation dynamics to the output gap estimations. This section compares the two 
cormnon measures that are adopted in the current study. 1bough, literature presupposes the 
biasness introduced based on the HP irethodology (see Kara et. al (2007), the current study ignores 
this presmnption and examines the relative rrovement of the gaps of the two rreasures used here. 
This comparison shows how closely the measures are correlated from the overall sample points 
and looks at the successive rrovements based on the graphical representation of the gaps. 
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1be table 5.22 reveals the correlation coefficients of the Kahnan and the HP senes. 
Generally, these two estimations are somewhat closely correlated. 1be correlation statistics range 
from 69% in Gennany to 99% in Chinese economy. These are strong positive correlation as 
expected. However, the lack of perfect relationship between these two rrethods allow us to 
Wlderstand the differentials that might be introduced in the regression estimations. On the average, 
we observe a closer relationship in the developing economies, followed by emerging economies. 
No coefficient in the developed economies gravitate aroWld 90%. Thus, these differences raise 
sorre empirical questions or disapprove the findings in the past literature that solely rely on either 
of the techniques. 1be correlations in France (78%), Germany (69%), Italy (73%), Mexico (79%) 
and Bangladesh (76%) are way fur to overlook the potential disparities that might be presented in 
the estimation and their policy implications. This reason justifies the need for variant tests of 
efficient measures. The following subsection discusses the graphical evaluations of the gaps along 
the business cycles. 
In fig. 5 . 1 ,  the Canadian HP started a little below the Kahnan's but irnrrediately swtmg up 
above the latter in approximately less than two years from the start year. 1be HP 
Wlderexaggerate/overexaggerates the deviation of actual outputs from its potentials as shown by 
the Kahnan's. To justify the latter, the HP may seem to over-exaggerate the Canadian recessionary 
crises and the expansionary economy. However, if HP is desired over the Kahnan's, the latter may 
introduce biasness to the recessionary or expansionary incidences. Though, the two gaps moved 
the same way, there are more than 90% of the times when the two deviated from each other. We 
may be in hurry to conclude that the policy information as desired for inflation processes by the 
authorities is likely to be limited for choosing an overexaggerated or tmderexaggerated output 
gaps. As will be shown in the following sections, output gaps are fimdamental to inflation' 
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predictions and a poor one may lead to policy mis-direction. The current study sornewhat 
overcomes this challenge by investigating into the postestirnation resuhs of these two methods. 
In fig. 5.2, the French HP and Kahnan's pretty much exhibit the Canadian's; also seen on 
their correlation coefficients. 1be HP gaps move swiftly above and below the Kahnan's at more 
than 90% of the times. In other words, the Kahnan slowly makes a tum from either direction. In 
some of the times, the recessionary or expansionary periods are predicted to last longer than the 
HP. Since Kahnan introduces some economic information in its methodology, the Kahnan's is 
likely to weigh in on the speed of macroeconomic policies on those factors and how the actual 
output quickly adjusts to its potentials. The differentials are not just purely statistical problem and 
the impact of economic policies on variables incorporated in the Kahnan's estimation are 
fimdamenta� also applies to all the economies. 
1hough, there are periods when the German Kalman's move closely with its col.Dlterpart 
HP (fig.5.3), the frequency of deviation is a little more than the other economies. Gerrmny has the 
lowest correlation coefficients within and across the groups. However, suffice to rnention that the 
difficulty in predicting the best method is lesser since the gaps walk in the same neighborhoods. 
There are, still, sorne years (such as 2009) when the differences are widely conspicuous. 
The Italian Kahnan and HP gaps (fig.5.4) gradually becarre widely apart :from past two 
decades. Nevertheless, they had walked together in same neighborhoods in the previous years. The 
implication rermins the same; the economic situations might be over-or-llllCier predicted in those 
years leading to policy misinformation. 
The Japan, United States and the United Kingdom's gaps (fig. 5.5-5.7) predict that both 
Kahnan and HP are more closely correlated. The frequency and the depth of the deviations from 
each other are not too wide apart at each consecutive period. These are revealed in their correlation 
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coefficients. There are also several years where there are convergences. 1be United States' ahmst 
fonned a convergent point at the end of the period. 'The Japanese and UK's were ahmst at the 
convergent point before the end of the period. 1bese rmvements pose a little less of stress which 
measures are desirable for these economies. 
The graphical representations of the Kalman and HP gaps (fig. 5.8-5.13) for the emerging 
economies reveal these two measures rmve closely. The gaps for the Chinese are much closer, 
srmother, and there are series of convergent points along the trends. In the Turkish gaps, there are 
several swings. The frequency and depth of deviation between the gaps are significant in the group. 
The South African shows a rmre consistent pattern, though, the HP is always above at the rising 
sections and below at the falling part throughout the periods. The Indian gaps exhibit about three 
points of opposite rmvements between the two gaps, but gaps never deviated widely from each 
other. Tue India bas the highest correlation coefficient in the group. The Mexican gaps swing 
swiftly and there are certain points of convergence. As discussed in the above, the Kahnan is likely 
to predict the economic situations later than HP or the HP swiftly tells on the performance of actual 
output gaps vis-a-vis the potential There are macroeconomic consequences for either fast or slow 
predictions. The rmnetary policies that respond quickly to the dictates of the earlier prediction 
might jeopardize the self-regulating mechanism in a dis-equilibrating economic condition More 
also, late response of the policy making to address too heating or dwindling economy, due to slow 
forecast, may deepen the level of economic crises before the need for collllteractive policies are 
desired. Thus, it requires that appropriate measmes of output gap is essential in policy ingredie nts. 
The Kalman and HP measmes (fig 5 . 14-5.20) for the developing economies display a 
closer rmvement armng the three categories of the economies. Except in China, the second highest 
correlation coefficient between the two gaps is the Pakistani' s. The other economies' coefficients 
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within the group range arounds 80%s. 1be rmverrents are consistent and, in sorre cases, are 
srmther. lbere are few cases when the gaps rmved in opposite directions and, as revealed in other 
groups, HP predicts that expansionary and recessionary crises are deeper than what Kahnan would 
acconnt for. lbere are several points of convergences and near-convergences. 1be HP turning 
points are sorreti:rres sharper. Nonetheless, som:: of these characteristics are rmre revealed in som:: 
economies than the other. This group does not escape the macroeconomic influence of having an 
over-or under-predicted gap based on whether gaps are relevant to explaining policy variables. In 
those economies where output gaps are rmre significant for inflation forecast it is necessary to 
exercise care on policy formulation In the case there are no policy align.rrent with the level of 
gaps, the crises can be rm re catastrophic and intense than normal In few occasions in the historic 
rmnetary planning and discretion in rrost these economies, there have been exhibition of policy 
blunders especially economies without a set policy principle; third world economies are rmst 
susceptible. 
5.1.2 Unit Root 
The table 5.22 displays the unit root tests for the all the variables. The study deploys 
Augirented Dickey Fuller technique to reveal the order of integration of the variables. The tests 
are conducted at drift and trerxl. 1be necessity of m::an reversion ofti:rre-series data in econom::tric 
rmdeling warrant the need to establish the order at which variables have constant means and 
variances in the succession As soown in the table 5.22, the tests are conducted on original data-
set and, at rrost, first differenced data. 1be following briefly discusses the stationarity armng the 
variables. 
The stationarity of inflation data for the developing economies was established at leve� the 
original data. Only Indian inflation data armng the em::rging economies has reverting m::an at 
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level but at first differencing for all other cotmtry within the group. Likewise, only Gennany has 
a stationary inflation data at level among the developed economies while others at first difference. 
Except in Japan at differencing, the HP gaps in devebped economies were mean reverting at level. 
For the Kahnan, stationarity was established for Germany and United Kingdom at level while 
other economies at first differencing. 1be HP gaps for brazil and China have mean reversions at 
leve� the other economies in the group are stationary at first difference. For the Kahmn, the 
stationary established at level for Mexico, Turkey and China while at first difference for Brazil, 
India and South Africa. Only HP gap for Egypt was stationary at level For Kahnan, Bangladesh, 
Ghana and Nigeria have a stationary series at level The exchange rates and trade series are 
stationary at level for all the economies in the three groups except Bangladesh exchange rate which 
was at first differencing. 
5.1.3 Endogeneity Tests 
1be exogeneity tests of the regressors are shown in the table 5.23- 5.28. The asslllllptio n 
of the exogeneity of the independent and lagged-lead regressors was that they are statistically 
independent of the white noise of the structural models. To establish the quality of exogeneity in 
the current study, I generate the residuals from all the structural models and estimate correlation 
matrices vis-a-vis the suspicious endogenous regressors. To do this, the tmbiasedness and 
consistencies of the structural parameters are verified among the non-instrument econometric and 
instrument econometric techniques adopted in the current study. 1be non-independence of the 
regressors with the stochastic terrns may warrant for parameter inconsistencies using non-
instrumenting method of estimation such as Ordinary Least Square. However, using instrument-
based method create some tensions on the error variance of the estimated parameters when 
regressors are, in met, independent of the stochastic disturbance terms. Therefore, thorough care 
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is required in the choice of the appropriate method of estimations. The previous chapter briefly 
highlighted ways in which endogeneity can emanate into the data; the demand shocks and price 
expectations may synchronize the stochastic term.5 into the output gap and inflation in the 
developed trodels. 
The statistical criterion for exogeneity is z.ero correlation (covariance) between regressors 
and the stochastic disturbance tenn The table 5.23-5.28 display correlation coefficients for all the 
parameters. All these coefficients have near-z.ero bm.mds. These raise critical question whether 
there is presence of endogeneity in the structural models. Though, past literature has focused more 
on the instrument econometric techniques (2SLS and GMM) and rarely empirically tested for 
endogeneity. The study tested for the evidence of endogeneity. lbere are no doubts that there is 
presence of correlation between the regressors and the residua� however, the statistical evidence 
is weak. Notwithstanding, the two set of techniques are adopted in this study; the 2SLS, GMM, 
BA YES and OLS. The study further makes clarity based on the post-estimation results of each 
methods. 
5.2 Regression Results 
The structural parameters of the models are reported in the table 5.29-5.40and are arranged 
based on the categories of the economies, the structural-type models, methods of estimations and 
the measures of output gaps. The discussions of the results would follow according to the 
numbering in the tables of resuhs as shown in the appendices. 1he resuhs are intermittently 
compared backward and forward and across the categories of the economies. The discussion later 
makes clarification on the differences in the results generated from the Kalman-based output gaps 
models and the HP gaps. It is noteworthy to add that the reported resuhs are significant parameters 
and the empty cells in the tables are non-significant parameters. Also, the first colurrm.s and the 
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second rows in each table of resuh contain the name of the countries and the estimators used 
respectively while the rest of the columns are the parameters as clearly defined in the methodology. 
Table 5.29 smnmarizes the backward-looking models for the developed economies for the 
two measures of output gaps. The result shows that output gaps have important infonnation on 
the inflation dynamics in Canada and this relationship is positive. Approximately 36% (37%)­
GMM-of changes in inflation is predicted by gaps. The two instrument-based methods predict 
higher figures than the non-instrument method by a sizeable significant point. They, however, 
conform in some respects. All techniques show inflation to be persistent in the Canadian economy 
at approximately more than 80%. The trade openness also impacts inflation positively but the 
relationship between inflation and exchange rate cannot be established. The French backward­
looking model clearly justifies the impact of output gap in the inflation processes. This is verified 
by the two measures of output gap. Inflation is persistent at roughly 90%. The influence of trade 
and exchange rate also enter inflation equation for HP model but only trade was significant under 
Kamm equation The Gennan baseline shows output gap was significant and inflation persists at 
roughly 85% to 90%. The trade and exchange rate were influential on inflation, but exchange rate 
was not significant under HP model The effects of Italian output gaps cannot be verified on 
inflation. The GMM indicates the Japanese HP gap exact influence on inflation In the two 
economies, inflation was persistent, and trade and exchange rate have effect on the inflation. The 
United States' output gap affect inflation and inflation was backward looking. Trade was totally 
insignificant on inflation while GMM for Kahnan partly reveals some level of relationship between 
exchange rate and inflation Kahnan estimation clearly shows output gaps, previous past inflation 
trade and exchange affect inflation for United Kingdom 
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Table 5.30 reports the empirical resuhs for emerging economies' backward model It is 
efficient to summarize that, except scarcely in Mexican and Turkish economies, the output gaps 
do not contain any information that impact inflation changes in the emerging economy for 
backward model Inflation was persistent in all the economies; ranging from 89%-1 09% for the 
Brazil's, 36%-99% for India's, 85%-89% for Mexico's, 67% - 95% for South Africa's, 8 1  %-92% 
for Turkey's and 68-%-81 % for the China's inflation data. Except in Mexico and China, trade 
does not impact inflation in emerging economies. The exchange rates positively afiect the inflation 
in Brazil, India, Mexico and China but was negative in South Africa and Turkey. 
Table 5 .31  displays backward model for the developing economies. Inflation is persistent 
in all the economies, but the impact of output gap is scarce. The impact of output gap on inflation 
was only reh on the inflation of Nigeria, Egypt and fairly in Pakistan. Trade afiects inflation on 
the economies, except in Nigeria, while effect of exchange rate is significant on inflation. 
Table 5.32- 5.34 sunnnarize the forward-looking structural model for the three groups of 
the economies. The resuhs suffer from purely statistical incoherence. Across all economies, the a 
priori were not met; majorly for the output gap. The current study does not presuppose what signs 
are mandatorily required, though we have declared the expected signs for our parameters in the 
methodology, the estimations distort the previous result findings under the backward-looking 
model and rail to conform to theoretical underpinnings in the output gap-inflation framework. 
Though, the conventional a priori for the output gap in the forward looking NKPC are not met in 
the current study, the inflation in all the economies are forward looking. The resuhs, here, then 
justifies the need to examine the hybrid versions which consists both the expected inflation, lagged 
inflation, output gaps and other control variables. 
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The hybrid tmdels for the developed economies are summarized in the table 5.35. The 
results show that inflation is forward - and backward- looking. However, the depth of influence 
diminished relative to the parameters reported in backward- or forward-looking tmdel Generally, 
the forward inertia appears to dominate over the backward inertia, though by lesser amount. The 
impact of output gap is significantly affected as we canoot provide support for output gap. The 
effect in Canada, Germany and Japan is scanty based on number of techniques. 
The hybrid results for the emerging economies are displayed in the table 5.36. Generally, 
the inflation persists and looks forward in the emerging economy based on the hybrid, there are 
however, little interference on the strength and significance on some of the parameters. There are 
mixed results on which .inertia dominates across the economies. We do not observe any 
improvement on output gap-inflation dynamics as compared to the backward looking. 
The hybrid tmdel of the developing economies; table 5.37, dissipate little clarity of the 
impact of the output gap on the inflation in Egypt and Pakistan However, the hybrid performs 
well on Indonesian data using the Kahnan output gap. In some economies, inflation mainta ins 
persistence, even they diminished in their effect on the current inflation The following discusses 
the results of the convex restricted tmdels. 
The introduction of convex restriction to the hybrid tmdel was required for two reasons in 
the ctuTent study; to eliminate the interference in the hybrid model and to compare magnitude of 
the parameters. Table 5.38-5.40 reveal that expected inflation dominates in the developed and 
developing economies and backward inflation dominates in the emerging economies. In India, the 
convex restriction is not justified. The HP gap is predicted to impact inflation in Germany and 
Japan but by lesser influence as compared to backward looking model The hybrid restricted model 
shows improvement for Egypt, Indonesia and Kenya for a Kalman output gap. 
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1be impact of output gap on inflation is more revealed in the backward-looking model in 
the developed economies than the three other models. 1berefore, the study follows Christiano, et 
al (2005) as their study proposes price indexation to past inflation in the NKPC model as so� 
proportion of the large :finm in a (sticky price) economy are always able to adjust their prices 
based on the past inflation. 1be impact of output gap in the e�rging economies is scarce across 
all the models, except the backward looking for the Mexican and the Ti.rrkish. The Nigerian and 
the Pakistani economy follow a backward-looking output gap- inflation model while the Egypt, 
Indonesia and Kenya data behave appropriately to the convex-restricted model. Conclusively, the 
study finds that there is no evidence of data compatibility with the NKPC fr�work in the 
developing and e�rging economies as much as the developed economies. 
Table 5.42 Sunnnary of Data-Model Compatibility in the Three Economic Categories 
Convex-Restricted 
Backward Looking Forward Looking Hybrid Model Model 
Canada Yes No Yes No 
France Yes No No No 
Genl1Cilly Yes No Yes Yes 
Italv Yes No - No 
Japan Yes No Yes Yes 
United 
Killl!dom Yes No No No 
United States Yes No No No 
Brazil No No No No 
India No No No Yes 
Mexico Yes No Yes No 
South Africa No No No No 
Ti.rrkev Yes No No No 
China No No No No 
Barurladesh No No Yes No 
Egypt Yes No No Yes 
Ghana No No No No 
Indonesia No No Yes Yes 




Yes No Yes No 
Yes No No No 
Yes - shows there is strong evidence of output gap - inflation relationship. No - shows the model not desirable or 
lack of coherence 
5.2.1 Brief Empirical Comparison and Post-Estimation 
This study gently contnbutes to the contentious debate on the disparities in the results of 
univariate (such as HP) and the multivariate output gap estimation in the NKPC frrurework. This 
study clarifies on these controversies based on the size of the differences in the magnitudes, the 
significance of the parameters across the results analyzed and their post-estimation statistics. 
The findings in the current study partially disagrees with Osman et al (2010) based on their 
lack of support for output gap in the inflation dynamics. Though, the selected economies may 
differ, but this study has established that the relationship between these economic variables are 
evolving in the developing countries. The finding for the Chinese was not consistent with the 
Zhang et al (20 1 1 )  which prefers the multivariate measure of output gap over the univariate. The 
study follows the paper by Khan (2004) which supported the impact of HP output gap in the 
inflation equation 
It is equally plausible to argue that the empirical suggestions of the Orphanides, et al 
(2005) and Valadkhani (2015), that both univariate and muhivariate fihering have ahmst the same 
significant effect on inflation, is technically correct. This study finds that the difference between 
these methods is not a matter of"which one affects inflation and does not" but a matter of''which 
one contains more inflation information". As revealed in the empirical study, ahnost 100% of times 
Kalman output gap predicts inflation, the HP output gap does the same but there is slight difference 
in the magnitude. 
The instrument and non-instrmrent-based estimation techniques are favorite in the current 
study, though the later underpredicts the impact of output gap and over-predicts the impact of past 
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inflation on inflation. However, only GMM and Bayes reveal consistently desirable post-
estirmtion (table 5.41) statistics. 1he GMM-Hasen J -statistics ideally shows a consistent rejection 
of identifying restriction problems more often than the 2SLS. Also, the Bayes-post estirmtion was 
more consic>tent with GMM's than its colll1terpart; OLS. 1be study concludes that GMM and Bayes 
are m:>re robust than other estimators. 
5.3 Policy Implication of Results 
The output gap impacts the inflation in the developed ecooomies irrespective of the 
treasures of output gap. Though, there are disparities in output gap rreasures, estimation 
procedures and NKPC frarreworks, the finding.5 align with the studies of Zhang, et al (2009), Gali 
et a1(1999 & 2005), Valadkhani (2015), Halka et al (2014) on significance of output gap on 
inflation dynamics in the developed economies but lend no credence to the Abba et al (2016). The 
recessionary crises (negative gaps) typically is a symptom of lower employrrent am decline in the 
potential output creates rear am:>ng conswrers, investors am sorretirres financial speculators. 
Usually, a late response to the recession impacts the demand am supply capacity and subsequently 
a dwindling general price level which discourage production and productivity. These crises 
nonnally snowball into the reduction in the capability of the policy irakers to regulate the 
economy. 
1be fiscal and monetary policies are often incapacitated in the event recessionary turmoil  
has stmk deep in the rank and file of the vital sectors of the economy. Therefore, we recommend 
that the developed economies should closely monitor rroverrent of output gaps along the business 
cycle. Suffice to say, the longevity of recessionary periods am bow significant the effect is on the 
inflation are determined by how good and inclusive the rronetary policies are in the economy. A 
poor monetary policy usually breeds lack of public confidence and lead to irrational economic 
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decisioru;. On the other hand, a heated economic condition (exparu;ionary gaps) strains the 
employment capacity of factors of production which eventually lead to higher comperu;ation 
demand in a weak policy economy. 1bough, this crisis is not as worse as the recession, the effect 
of uncontrolled expansion can trickle down to overall prices in the economy; especially the 
financial prices. Normally, when interest rate for big invest:rrent is affected at the COITlJ:rercia l 
levei the cost of production smges and the goods prices increases. This effect breeds inflation 
persistence. The opposite happens during recessionary crisis. Therefore, the economies that show 
high influence of output gaps on inflation should have consistent policies that strive to maintain 
zero or near-zero output gaps to avoid its macroeconomic coru;equences. 
The ctnTent study weakly aligns with empirical finding of Pichette, Robitaille Salameh and 
St-Amant (2018) on the usefulness of the output gap information in the Canadian inflation 
forecasting. The study had suggested that output gaps reduces errors in forecasting as compared to 
rrodel relying on backward inflation inertia, however, found weak support of the former on the 
later. In my opinion based on the iterated rrodels, the Canadian inflation evidently follows a 
backward process, and this should be useful for policy discretion. The ctnTent study, nonetheless, 
agrees that the measmes of output gap can either overestimate or W1derestirnate its influence on 
inflation, but Canadian inflation would better be predicted with models including past lags and 
gaps. In the United states, though the paradigm is shifting to how big the gap is (see Weider and 
Williams; 2009), this study reveals a recession or heated economic activities contnbute to inflation 
processes. 
In the selected economies in Emo area; France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, the study 
found evidence of relationship between the gaps and inflation. 1be study lends credence to the 
findings of Jarocinski and Lenza (2016), Boh and Van Els (1998). The notion that lagging real 
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econormc activities weaken the capacity of the price system to allocate resources is technically 
plausible in these economies. Also, price indexation tends to focus on the previous behavior in the 
giant economies in the Euro Area. This finding is essential for inflation policy discretion for 
European economies. 
The finding for the Japanese sunnnarizes the influential paper of Kamada (2005). The study 
found that the inflation llX>del that follows AR process perform; better and output gap exhibits 
policy ingredients for inflation determination, however, decry the several biases introduced by 
some measures of gap. Our study beckons for the support of gaps and lagged inflation in the 
Japanese inflation equation 
Except in United Kingdom, trade openness impact positively on inflation in the developed 
economy. These effects are significant, however, have lower impact than other variables in the 
llX>dels. As expected, these ecooomies are more open to the global economy and within 
themselves. It is rightly justified that domestic inflation can be influenced based on the foreign 
changes in prices. United States purchase billions of dollars of goods from rest of the world and 
now owing billions of dollars to China. The change in prices and exchange rate in the intematio na l 
market can always synchronize into financial debt that can affect domestic output, inflation and 
other economic variables. Most of these countries have the same pattern with United States. Except 
in Italy where are no evidence for the exchange rate, depreciation of the domestic currencies 
inflates prices in the developed economies. We may not make a strong argwnent for this finding; 
however, a loosened exchange rate can cause an open economy to have higher prices due to 
inflated prices of the imported goods resulting from corresponding appreciation of partner' s  
exchange rate. Though, the effect is not strong, this study advocates for a solid llX>netary strategy 
for regulating exchange rate vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
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1be relationship between output gaps and the inflation is not common in the emerging 
economies. However, this relation has started developing in some of the economies as enurrerated 
in the discussion. 1be ctnTent study follows the argurrent of Kara et al (2007) for Turkish 
economy and reiterates the empirical find in gs of Zhang et al (201 1 )  on Chinese data on inflation 
persistence. 1be theoretic a priori of the output gap cannot be established in the ctnTent study for 
rmst of the economies. 1be implications for lagging or too heated economy remain as explicated 
for developed economies. Nevertheless, we suggest that the background social-economic situation 
in these economies may be rmre profound to equivocate the process of separating the real effect 
and spiral effect of contractionary or expansionary economy on the level of inflation in these 
economies. Aside the inadequacy in the economic data compilation, the above fuctor may be the 
reason for the lack of empirical coherence of the NKPC framework in all the emerging economies 
when compared to the developed economies. Since the economies .are at the race for convergence 
with the western counterpart, economic restructuring should go along with dehberate rmnetary 
and fiscal policies to maintain their economic strength in the workl market. Thus, this probably 
will enable the authorities to set the prodoctive inflation in right trajectory. 
The finding on inflation persistence align with the past studies (see Gerlach and Peng, 
2006) in China. This brings to bear how agents in the economy adjusts to future expectation of 
price changes in this economy and how inflation policy should trend to rmve parallel with agents' 
perception about the future. A profound study of Alberola, et al (2016) showed the influence of 
price changes on output gap in Latin Alrerica; this includes Mexico and Brazil. This finding can 
be accorrnrodated as this study has briefed how uncontrolled gaps can, sometimes, lead to spiral 
effect. That is, W1fegulated recessionary gaps can lead to lower prices, lower income, lower 
demand, decline in capacity utilization and lower employment, which make output to finther fall 
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below its potential Though, there is oo evidence of output gap information in the inflation in 
Brazj}, inflation persists. This suggestion is also useful for South African, Turkish and Indian 
ecooomies. 
On trade, except scarcely in Mexico and China, openness was not significant on inflation. 
This finding is largely welco�. Most of the ecooomies sell as moch or less what they purchase 
from the rest of the world. The ecooomies do oot necessarily import inflation through trade from 
the international market. The case of China and Mexico may be slightly different. The Chinese, 
for example, has huge markets in the Africa, Europe and America, likewise the Mexican arrong 
the NAFTA The impact of trade on inflation may be expected. 
The impact of exchange rate is oot the � as the developed cotmtries. The results reveal 
appreciation oftheir currencies worsens the inflation. This may result from interplay of financ ial 
instruments (so�tirnes its speculation) and the changes in exchange rates of these economies. 
The short-tenn appreciation of currencies can increase speculation for high financial investment 
return.5 and haven for investors looking ways of protecting their inves�nt. However, sooner or 
later, these funds are repatriated away leaving a large invest�nt reserve vacuum and short of 
funds. The aftermath is severe competition for real invest�nt fi.md/credit which shoot up the cost 
ofborrowing and general price level This experience is roost rampant in the emerging economies. 
Therefore, there should be adequate financial inflow/outflow control to circlllllVent the ecooornic 
crises of the past. 
The findings for the developing economies replicate the e�rging economies. The 
influence of output gap on inflation dynamics is, at rrnst, just evolving in the developing 
ecooomies. However, there are clear evidences in so� of these economies. In the past, so� of 
these economies battled stagflation making it diffi.cuh for data to fit a sourxi NKPC theoretical 
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models. This study does not blame lack of full empirical support for the models in these economies, 
but anti-theoretical economic condition sorretimes hides the plausibility of relationships between 
fundamental economic variables. Nonetheless, five out of eight of these economies reveal that 
output gaps affect inflation. Thus, sol.llld monetary and fiscal strategies that align with business 
cycle shoukl be advocated for to adequately control inflation As revealed in the descriptive 
statistics, the average inflation for most of these economies gravitate double-digit. This kind of 
inflation discourage consumptions and when consumption is low, the employment rate declines 
leading to recessions. The result is a spiral effect on all essential economic aggregate which may 
be the reason most developing economies are still not developed. 
Inflation dynamics is more backward in Nigerian economy. This finding is consistent with 
Ibrahim, Bawa, Abdullah� Didigu & Mainasara (2015). This evidence inform; that monetary 
policy rate (CBN rate) shoukl be designed to move with the agent perception of past price behavior 
on the future. The gaps are also fundamental tools in the inflation processes. This finding supports 
the study of Bukhari and Khan (2008) on how gaps pressure prices in Pakistan This study also 
volurres up the finding of Ochieng, et al (2016) on the inflation persistence in Kenya. The paper 
ofMoriyama (20 1 1 )  employs different rrethod to capture inflation inertia but found that inertia is 
fi.mdamental in the inflation processes in Egypt. This study reached closely this finding. 
Conclusively, inflation looks back in all economies in this study. This informs the policy makers 
on how the monetary policy can be engineered to stabilize general price level in the future and 
bow fiscal policy can address the demand pressures in a principled economy. 
The influence of trade and exchange rates are also evident in sorre of these economies. The 
openness to the rest of the world has contributed a greatly to economies of the third world CO\mtries 
but the influence of exacerbating exchange rate and l..lllfuvorable trade balance have sorretimes 
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collapsed the rmnetary capability to regulate inflation in these economies. There is urgent call on 
the policy makers to redefine trade and :financial relations with the global economy. 
The above policy suggestion bas tihed towards backward inertias. This was because I could 
pen down its consistencies to the theoretic a prior, past findings and its contnbutions in revealing 
essential infurmation for inflation forecast. However, the forward inertia is also relevant in all the 
economies, as revealed in the hybrid version of the st:roctural rrodels. I understand the importance 
of speculations in forming present economic behavior, nonetheless, I reconnnend that care should 




The objective of this paper is to examine the inflation information that is contained in the 
output gap using the New Keynesian Phillips Curve frarrework. As informed by the rmdei the 
study is also set to investigate inflation persistence and the influence of forward inertia on the 
ctnTent inflation. This paper follows the Gali and Monacelli (2005) of the small open-economy 
type of rmdel However, the ctnTent study differs by introducing external fuctors (trade and real 
exchange rate) not only on the hybrid rmdei also on the backward, forward and the hybrid 
restricted rmdels for time-series data (1971 -2017) of all twenty (20) economies considered in the 
study. We adopt two measmes of output gaps; the univariate (Hodrick Prescott) and the 
Muhivariate (Kahnan) gap estimation approaches and deploy instrument-based (Generalized 
Method of Moment & Two-Stage Least Square) and non-instrument based (Bayes and Ordinary 
Least Square) econometric techniques to generate the structural parameters. 
This study contributes to the existing literatme through its findings and policy suggestion. 
I resolve that the developed economies' data appropriately fit the backward-looking rmdel Thus, 
the output gap rmunt pressme on the inflation in those economies and their inflation data follow 
first autoregressive process; the past inflation. Though, this study supports the influence of 
expected inflation on the CtnTent inflation, and the theoretic plausibility in the three other set of 
the structural rmde� forward looking, hybrid and restricted hybrid rmdels, there is lack of 
empirical coherence. Therefore, advocate for backward NKPC in the developed economies. All 
these said, rmnetary and fiscal strategies should be designed to incorporate the output gaps and 
immediate past inflation in inflation forecasting in these economy's category. 
This study does not find support for gap-inflation relationship in rmst of the emerging 
economies. However, sight a weak relation in Mexico and Tmkey in the backward-looking 1rodel. 
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I also cannot verify any improvernent on the relationship using the other three structural trodels. 
1his finding generalizes the relevance of output gaps in the rmnetary discretions. However, 
advocate the inclusion of inflation inertia in the policy ingredients for all the economies in this 
category. 
The findings in the developing economies are not as moch revealing. This study does not 
ascertain a specific type of rmdel for all these cotmtries. Nigeria and Pakistan follow the backward 
rmde� Bangladesh follows hybrid rmdei Egypt, Indonesia and Kenya follow hybrid restricted 
rmdel Though, there was no doubt relationship exists in these highlighted economies, I ca006Enot 
technically verify consistencies as depicted in the backward-looking rmdels for the developed 
economies. 
On the external factors, this study supports the findings of Gali, et al (2005) but disagree 
with the findings of Abba, et al (20 1 6) on trade and exchange rate. Though, the impacts of these 
factors cannot be verified in all economies, majority shows that these macroeconomic predictors 
synchronize into inflation processes. 1his study also clarify the controversies on the output gap 
measures. This study points out that the differences in the univariate measure and muhivariate 
measure of output is not a matter of ''which one is significant on inflation" but a matter of"which 
one contains more inflation information". lberefore, they are both significant in determining 
inflation in those economies that exhibit gap-inflation relationship. 
In short words, the data-NKPC trodel compatibil ity in the emerging and developing 
economies is just evolving while backward NKPC fit the developed economies' data. 
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Table 5 . 1  Developed Economies: Inflation 
Canada France Germany 
Mean 4.124254 4. 191586 2.535365 
Median 3.255940 2.229545 1 .975525 
Maximum 1 5 . 198 10  1 3.77669 7.621336 
Italy 
6.884652 




1 .829907 5.794775 
0.568373 3.348881 
20.81005 25.77764 
Minimum -2.294247 0.1 36763 -0.449788 0.3 19446 - 1 .895164 0.456272 
Std. Dev. 3.525731 4.034952 1 .9074 10  6.270509 4.1 34623 
Skewness 1 .05 1 098 0.986368 0.91 1679 0.943470 2.586128 
Kurtosis 3.883343 2.5 1 1451 3. 1 85 149 2.488416 1 1 .29305 
JarQue-Bera 10 . 1 8239 8.088636 6.577869 7.485255 187.0736 
Probability 0.006 15 1  0.017522 0.037294 0.023692 0.000000 
Stun 193.8399 197.0045 1 19.1621 323.5786 86.00564 
Stun Sq. Dev. 571 . 8 1 59 748.91 85 167.3577 1 808.687 786.3748 
0 bservations 47 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 .2 Emerging Economies: Inflation 
Brazil India Mexico South Africa 
Mean 48.37063 7.403226 24.47204 10.69376 
Median 20.25389 7.57501 8 15 .42969 10. 1 3395 
Maximum 168. 1843 1 7.82972 1 39.6568 24.87883 
Minimum 3.79 12 15  - 1 .648682 1 .529728 5 . 12 1 383 
Std. Dev. 49.16983 3.844925 29.45932 4.533278 
Skewness 0.8 10359 0.545160 2.234377 0.794096 
Kurtosis 2.2225 1 5  3.737641 7.922 139 3.209728 
Jarque-Bera 6.327791 3.393617 86.55287 5.025749 
Probability 0.042261 0.1 83268 0.000000 0.081035 
Stun 2273.420 347.95 16 1 1 50. 186 502.6068 
Stun Sq. Dev. 1 1 1 2 12.9 680.0385 3992 1 . 1 7  945.3280 
Observations 47 47 47 47 






1391 .9 1 3  
47 
Turkey 






3.7238 1 8  
8.914674 
0.0 1 1 593 





















- 1 .26841 0  
4.648983 
1 .394229 







Table 5 .3 Developing Economies: Inflation 
Barurladesh Egypt Ghana Irxlonesia Kenya 
Mean 1 0.22552 1 0.80273 3 1 .04854 1 3.72525 9.987974 
Median 6.727860 10.39019 27.2301 1 10 . 1 5071 9.550720 
Maximum 80.56976 3 1 . 1 38 1 6  123.0612 75.271 1 7  41 .98877 
Minimum - 1 7.63042 0.869954 5 . 18201 3  2.253771 -9.2 1 9158 
Std. Dev. 1 5 .47296 6.1 14 145 2 1 .98910 12.77342 7.741058 
Skewness 2.956479 0.899055 2. 149327 2.966396 1 .443686 
Kurtosi5 12 .97266 4.37 1 3 1 6  8.398256 13 .49128 8.222882 
Jarque-Bera 263.2335 10.01435 93.25503 284.4771 69.74684 
Probability 0.000000 0.006690 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 480.5992 507.7283 1459.281 645.0865 469.4348 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 1 1 01 2.97 1 7 1 9.607 2224 1 .95 7505.373 2756.503 
Observatio 
ns 47 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 .4 Developed Economies: Hodrick Prescott Gap 
Canada France Gennanv ltalv Japan 
Mean 0.060656 0.05402 1 -0.005480 -0.080102 -0.1 56675 
Median 0.569250 0.023385 0.452460 -0.284706 -0.467394 
Maximum 3.613361 4. 1 1 6088 4.341 396 5.797045 7.046628 
Minimum -5.647248 -3.013371 -4.85 1 903 -4.413726 -5.351 799 
Std. Dev. 2.697673 1 .987883 2.26601 7  2.472 105 3.24 1 1 22 
Skewness -0.586917 0 . 174051 -0.349670 0.3 1 5060 0.340342 
Kurtosis 2.1 92760 1 .900473 2.436736 2.368528 2.3 1 6 1 1 7  
Jarque-Bera 3.974483 2.604848 1 .579090 1 .558457 1 .823259 
Probability 0.1 37073 0.271872 0.454051 0.458760 0.401869 
Sum 2.850854 2.539000 -0.257544 -3.764792 -7.363736 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 334.7623 1 8 1 .7772 236.2024 281 . 1 199 483.2240 
Observation 
s 47 47 47 47 47 
Nmeria Pakistan 
20. 1 3 1 5 1  9.809539 
1 1 .63000 8.585055 
1 1 3.0764 25.43683 
-5.665685 0.400237 
24.78512  5 .829709 
2.229756 1 . 1 85476 
8.057525 3.920895 
89.03720 1 2.66936 
0.000000 0.001774 
946.1 808 461 .0483 





-0.561 962 -0.306196 
8.21 9922 6.366513 
-5.496036 -6.809566 
3 . 1 65824 2.880857 
0.389359 0.084621 
2.451591 2.608856 
1 .7765 1 1  0.355705 
0.41 1 373 0.837066 
-0.95 1953 - 1 .7 1 7784 
461 .0322 38 1 .7696 
47 47 
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Table 5.5 Emerging Economies: Hodrick Prescott Gap 
Brazj} India Mexico South Africa Turkey 
Mean 0.21 7277 1 . 1 04706 0.009753 0.059374 0.322881 
Median -0. 1 1 1432 0.946587 -0.259 1 1 3  0.597521 1 .248102 
Maximum 12 .92682 16.28501 15 .83962 8.856621 1 0.77021 
Minimum - 1 1 .74893 - 1 1 .48831 -7.425376 -6.509810 - 1 1 .93242 
Std. Dev. 5. 135574 6.362799 4.566133 3.660055 5.435222 
Skewness 0. 1 1 1 891 -0.0335 14 1 . 1 79044 0. 1 27966 -0.399946 
Kurtosis 2.501 243 2.504896 5.266424 2.394043 2.628424 
Jarque-Bera 0.585222 0.488840 20.94880 0.847343 1 .523378 
Probability 0.7463 1 2  0.783 1 59 0.000028 0.654639 0.466877 
Swn 10.21202 5 1 .921 1 6  0.458400 2.790582 1 5 . 1 7541 
Swn Sq. Dev. 1 2 13 .2 10  1 862.320 959.0803 616.2160 1358.9 1 5  
0 bservations 47 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 .6 Developing Economies: Hodrick Prescott Gap 
Barurladesh Egypt Ghana Indonesia Kenya Nigeria 
Mean -0.041005 0.066023 0.0852 1 9  0.397391 0.388127 0 . 177302 
Median -0.360931 -0.402348 0.865786 -0.426929 -0.25 1 1 89 1 .555 1 38 
Maximum 1 7.55352 18.79369 1 7.39758 1 5.09298 9.042292 25.34056 
Minimum -6.9784 1 8  -8.619667 - 1 3 . 1 6040 -8.500895 -9.042331 -21 .3 1 680 
Std. Dev. 4.497887 4.56743 1 6.613741 6.3 1 57 16  4.792498 1 0.43504 
Skewness 1 .4 19376 1 .308268 0. 1 05721 0.651 999 -0.034718 -0.0648 1 7  
Kurtosis 6.61 6760 7.435409 2.51 8945 2.882 17 1  2 . 190748 2.954907 
Jarque-Bera 41 .398 1 1  5 1 .93325 0.540739 3.357158 1 .291933 0.036891 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.763098 0. 1 86639 0.524156 0.981723 
Swn - 1 .927244 3 . 103077 4.005312  1 8.67737 1 8.24197 8.333208 
Swn Sq. Dev. 930.6254 959.6257 20 12. 1 1 2  1 834.860 1056.530 5008.941 
0 bservations 47 47 47 47 47 47 
China 
13.22529 
4.26835 1  
1 30.6872 
























Table 5.7 Developed Economies: Kalman Gap 
Canada France Gennany Italy 
0.060656 0.054021 -0.005480 -0.080102 
United United 
Japan K.iru!dom States 
-0.1 56675 -0.020254 -0.036549 
Median 0.338589 -0.148931 0.508331 -0.289026 -0.226659 0.104140 -0.274126 
Maximum 3.287864 3.068772 2.952610 4.328470 5.762074 5.762068 4.300448 
Minimum -4.438206 -2.591 166 -3.3923 1 2  -2.768795 -4.285406 -5.052738 -5.922410 
Std. Dev. 2. 1 60698 1 .551 377 1 .582140 1 .8 1 8269 2.69201 3  2.609821 2.472 1 1 7  
Skewness -0.569842 0.094076 -0.549067 0.501974 0.257965 0. 135722 -0.051 909 
Ktntosis 2.279302 1 .988828 2.569855 2.5241 1 5  2.209365 2.404056 2.2402 1 6  
Jarque-Bera 3.5608 1 3  2.071661 2.723892 2.417322 1 .745439 0.839794 1 . 1 5 1 599 
Probability 0.1 68570 0.354932 0.256162 0.298597 0.417814 0.6571 14  0.562255 
Sum 2.850854 2.539000 -0.257544 -3.764792 -7.363736 -0.951952 - 1 . 7 1 7784 
Sum Sq. Dev. 2 1 4.7564 1 1 0.7 1 1 4  1 1 5 . 1456 152.0807 333.3590 3 1 3.3 1 36 28 1 . 1227 
0 bservations 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 .8 Emerging Economies: Kalman Gap 
Brazil India Mexico 
Mean 0.2 1 7277 1 . 1 04706 0.009753 
Median 0.029095 0.816103 -0.31 9005 
Maximum 1 1 .58482 1 7.52520 1 1 .98528 
Minimum - 1 0.32935 -9.853484 -7. 1 3291 1 
Std. Dev. 4 . 191609 5.801456 3.6486 12 
Skewness 0 . 1 74462 0.327881 1 . 1 99362 
Ktntosis 3.228095 3.246967 5.090355 
Jaroue-Bera 0.340308 0.961572 19.82512 
Probability 0.843535 0.61 8297 0.000050 
Sum 10.21202 5 1 .92 1 1 6 0.458400 
Sum So. Dev. 808.201 1 1 548.217 6 1 2.3689 
0 bservations 47 47 47 
47 47 47 
South Africa Turkey China 
0.059374 -0.020254 1 3.22529 
0.5 1 1 91 0  0. 104140 3.080421 
7.332405 5.762068 134.0179 
-5.323051 -5.052738 - 1 2.58217 
3.078079 2.609821 30.51279 
0. 1 34586 0. 135722 2.254538 
2.327670 2.404056 8 . 1 72541 
1 .027109 0.839794 92.2 1 1 95 
0.598365 0.657 1 14 0.000000 
2.790582 -0.951952 621 .5886 
435.8302 3 1 3.3 1 36 42827.41 
47 47 47 
81 
Table 5.9 Developing Economies: Kalman Gap 
Barurladesh Egypt Ghana Indonesia 
Mean -0.041005 0.066023 0.0852 1 9  0.397391 
Median -0.786650 -0.395750 1 .380420 -0.633740 
Maximum 1 6.28331 1 8.30554 14.33346 1 6.98680 
Miniinum -3.776505 -6.039786 -9. 1 8 1 339 -8.275061 
Std. Dev. 3.450647 3.953591 5.560706 5.502154 
Skewness 2.785735 2.399557 0.00235 1  0.882474 
Kurtosis 1 2.87263 1 1 .75 1 97 2.393699 3.575095 
Jarque-Bera 251 .6655 195. 1 058 0.71 9929 6.747984 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.697701 0.034253 
SlD11 - 1 .927244 3 . 103077 4.0053 1 6  18.67737 
SlD11 Sq. Dev. 547.7203 7 1 9.0206 1422.387 1392.590 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 . 1 0  Developed Economies: Trade (Growth) 
Canada France Germany Italy 
Mean 3.933085 3.933444 4.422671 3.538227 
Median 3.31 8837 3.937962 5.413781 3.056268 
Maximum 1 9.04994 28.38876 18.43555 26.36857 
Miniinum - 1 5 .38608 - 14.66783 - 1 7.605 1 0  -21 .2 1643 
Std. Dev. 6.655883 7.245537 6.933093 8.476586 
Skewness -0.453908 0. 1 02476 -0.576289 -0.055584 
Kurtosis 4.016681 5.6 1 1 375 4.242320 4.076824 
Jarque-Bera 3.638133 13 .43668 5.623936 2.294989 
Probability 0. 1 62 1 77 0.001209 0.060087 0.3 1 743 1 
SlD11 1 84.8550 1 84.8719 207.8655 1 66.2967 
SlD11 Sq. 
Dev. 2037.836 2414.899 221 1 . 1 1 8 3305.215 
0 bservation 
s 47 47 47 47 
Kenya Nigeria Pakistan 
0.388127 0.1 77302 0.052909 
-0.095581 0.919496 -0.903800 
7.029647 20.61544 22.32737 
-9. 1 4 1 257 - 1 8.36420 -5.6 1 6330 
3.971 548 8.804047 4.582128 
-0.100615 0.038603 2.979 1 78 
2.289556 2.95 1081  14.22808 
1 .067730 0.016360 3 1 6.4 1 14 
0.586334 0.991853 0.000000 
1 8.24197 8.333206 2.486741 
725.5669 3565.5 1 7  965.8 1 1 5 
47 47 47 
United United 
Japan Kingdom States 
4.457400 3.303559 5.209535 
5.933379 2.625146 5.888965 
37.706 14 21 .55756 25.07184 
-32.65979 - 1 1 .53795 - 1 9.58146 
1 2.04624 6.652662 7.885393 
-0.353988 0.379204 -0.4418 14  
4.597052 3.767506 4.5 18567 
5.976451 2.279985 6.045073 
0.050377 0.319821 0.048678 
209.4978 1 55.2673 244.8481 
6675. 145 2035.864 2860.254 
47 47 47 
82 
Table 5 . 1 1 Emerging Economies: Trade (Growth) 
Brazil India Mexico 
Mean 5.41 4762 9.743486 7.078290 
Median 5.6635 1 9  8.780078 8.285441 
Maximum 36.28306 32.30569 41 .34450 
Minimum - 1 9.00169 -7.266632 - 1 8.44929 
Std. Dev. 12.94238 8.780544 9.935245 
Skewness 0.375676 0.280656 0.346102 
Kurtosis 2.806875 2.556947 5.021233 
Jarque-Bera 1 . 1 78575 1 .001429 8.938868 
Probability 0.554722 0.606097 0.01 1454 
Sum 254.4938 457.9438 332.6797 
Sum Sq. Dev. 7705.239 3546.506 4540.61 8  
Observations 47 47 47 
South Africa 
3.3929 1 8  
4. 100944 
24.61075 
-25 . 1 1 4 1 4  
9.385825 
-0.525478 




4052.3 1 1  
47 
Table 5 . 1 2  Developing Economies: Trade (Growth) 
Barurladesh Egypt Ghana Indonesia Kenva 
Turkey 













Mean 6.81 3473 7.053975 8 . 194433 7. 17671 9  4.399578 6.82 1 1 09 
Median 3.066872 2.648937 7.459082 8.999299 1 .948881 1 .7 16941 
Maximum 1 1 5.0802 78.595 14 77.06191  49.23082 38.42549 82.08386 
China 
14.64241 
12 . 15459 
49.78985 













Minimum -24.93676 - 1 8.35423 -44.80508 -34.04263 - 1 6.805 1 6  -31 .99287 - 1 0.7541 6  
Std. Dev. 20.31952 1 8.95047 25.22242 14.39254 12.20798 25.48333 10.57367 
Skewness 3.231 222 1 .897129 0.563870 0. 1 38613 0.82 1 1 8 1  0.673798 1 .277245 
Kurtosis 1 8.44487 7.004557 3.981 345 4.422 1 1 2  3.761 543 3.064769 5.7323 13  
Jarque-
Bera 548.9352 59.59770 4.376554 4. 1 1 1 043 6.41 8046 3.564579 27.39894 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0. 1 1 2 1 1 0 0.1 28026 0.040396 0.1 68252 0.000001 
Stun 320.2332 331 .5368 385.1 384 337.3058 206.7801 320.5921 259.5677 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 1 8992.61 16519.53 29263.83 9528.683 6855.597 29872.41 5 1 42.918 
Observatio 
ns 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 
83 
Table 5 . 1 3  Developed Economies: Real Exchange Rate (Growth) 
United 
Canada France Germany Italy Japan Kingdom 
Mean -0.340484 -0.1 473 1 2  -0. 1 85310  0 . 157125 1 .522271 0.002298 
Median -0.313386 0.1 53596 0.033303 0.828926 1 .936720 0.296531  
Maximum 1 0.58979 1 4.70648 10.02051 13 .36946 32.08450 1 7.91 125 
Minimum -8.3 1 7 1 65 -6.399981 -8.7204 1 0  - 1 6.80144 -20.4803 1 - 1 2.94099 
Std. Dev. 4.616852 3.414621 4.275681 5 . 1 2 1 750 1 0.44721 6.389700 
Skewness 0.1 96999 1 .532389 0. 1 1 5347 -0.790390 0.3 141 1 2  0.439044 
Ktntosis 2.401456 8.869646 2.850393 5.071 109 3 . 1 1 5859 3.546446 
Jarque-Bera 1 .005583 85.8643 1 0. 1 48054 13 .29387 0.799173 2.094715  
Probability 0.604840 0.000000 0.928646 0.001298 0.670597 0.350864 
Sum - 1 6.00277 -6.923656 -8.709578 7.384867 7 1 .54676 0 . 1 08000 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 980.5047 536.3434 840.9466 1206.687 5020.633 1 878.100 
Observatio 
ns 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 . l  4 Emerging Economies: Real Exchange Rate (Growth) 
Brazli India Mexico South Africa Turkey 
Mean -4.834125 - 1 .355963 0.304290 -0.723532 -0.348738 
Median - 1 .848742 -0.87 1 1 57 0.249500 -2.708377 1 .007747 
Maximum 3 5 . 1 2 1 78 10.83 1 30 3 1 . 1 9783 30. 1 6406 12.09981 
Minimum -38.53402 - 16 . 1 3303 -35.68775 -24.10837 -26.65357 
Std. Dev. 1 6.64053 6.452846 12.76930 1 0.32890 9.271490 
Skewness -0. 1 2 1 7 1 2  -0.202072 -0.566563 0.931 564 -0.853473 
Kurtosis 2.599753 2.673559 4.264568 4.643997 3.247484 
Jaraue-Bera 0.429762 0.528546 5.646084 1 2.09070 5.825871 
Probabilitv 0.806637 0.767764 0.059425 0.002369 0.0543 1 6  
Sum -227.2039 -63.73028 14.301 64 -34.00600 - 1 6.39070 
Sum Sq. Dev. 12737.73 1 9 1 5 .404 7500.531 4907.567 3954. 1 85 




1 1 .27120 
- 14.34883 
5.238987 
-0. 1 79539 









10.3 1 692 
-31 .24870 









Table 5 . 1 5  Developing Economies: Real Exchange Rate (Growth) 
Baru!ladesh Egypt Ghana Indonesia 
Mean 5.392695 1 0. 1 8884 32.07964 1 0.92377 
Median 3.000185 7.48E-06 15 .34702 4.217221 
Maximum 48. 14219 1 02.4522 307.5458 244. 1 841 
Minimum -4.592354 -8.470064 - 12.62882 -21 .55536 
Std. Dev. 8.683230 24.37774 55.50968 36.50952 
Skewness 3.042606 2.595358 3.542006 5.716470 
Kurtosis 14.35220 8.694 153 1 6.57529 37.05309 
Jarque-Bera 324.8920 1 16.2602 459.1737 2526.887 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 253.4567 478.8754 1507.743 5 1 3.4170 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 3468.331 27336.61 14 174 1 .0 6 13 1 5.47 
Obs 47 47 47 47 
Table 5 . 1 6  Developed Economies: Real Interest Rate 
Canada France Germany Italy 
Mean 7.617199 6.096784 4.651087 9.806678 
Median 6.604 167 5.846675 4.330833 9.324167 
Maximum 19.29167 1 5.25917 12 . 14250 19.90528 
Minimum 2.395833 -0.329050 -0.329050 3.000833 
Std. Dev. 3.991 834 4.284793 3 . 1 78943 4.67 13 14  
Skewness 0.724965 0.229207 0.494616  0.493059 
Kurtosis 3.076410  2.056821 2.737225 2.1 24575 
Jarque-Bera 4.128433 2 . 1 53637 2.05 16 10  3.405145 
Probability 0.1269 1 8  0.340678 0.358508 0.182214 
Sum 358.0083 286.5488 2 18.601 1 460.9139 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 732.9979 844.5347 464.8612 1003.774 






























321 .9049 82.30922 
-9.474467 -3.558019 
52.42981 12.70 1 1 8  
4.487137 4.475440 
25 . 1 7024 27.0 10 16  
1 120.279 1285.853 
0.000000 0.000000 
914.8971 346.7535 
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Table 5 . 1 7  Developing Economies: Real Interest Rate 
Banmadesh Egypt Indonesia Kenya 
Mean 12.92773 14. 1 7 198 19.08139 1 6.71 846 
Median 12.93250 13.79167 20.82500 14.80454 
Maximum 16.00000 20.32833 32 . 15417 36.24000 
Minimum 9.540000 8.000000 1 1 .07333 9.000000 
Std. Dev. 1 .6 19809 2.664033 4.628031 6.732016 
Skewness 0.237904 0.228585 0.050573 1 .270957 
Ktntosis 2.575882 3.054797 2.938082 4.01 7942 
Jarque-Bera 0.79561 1 0.4 1 5 1 80 0.027543 14.68266 
Probability 0.671793 0.812540 0.986323 0.000648 
Sum 607.6034 666.0829 896.8252 785.7677 
Sum Sq. Dev. 120.6940 326.4654 985.2589 2084.722 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
Table 5.18 Develo Jed Economies: Exoort (Growth) 
Canada France Gennany Italy Japan 
Nigeria 
1 5 .48857 
16.84917 












Mean 8.2 17 12 1  8.388 158  6.921250 1 1 .06256 6.398835 8.739658 
Median 7.839187 6.530751 7.454989 10.48591 4.84 1 123 9.846098 
Maximum 27.63070 37.31537 29.25 1 78 52.84095 61 .69528 34.91 893 
Minimum -24.63785 - 17.28536 - 1 8.37413 -20.94305 -33.1 3763 -9.475881 
Std. Dev. 9.259749 9.422 192 7.479025 1 1 .73229 13 .46747 9.5693 13  
Skewness -0.488292 0.365645 -0.1 99309 0.846467 0.990872 0.353897 
Ktntosis 4.933 154 4. 138162 5.393433 5.744396 8.453872 3.246107 
Jaraue-Bera 9.381604 3.660397 1 1 .77484 20.79547 67.34405 1 . 1 23080 
Probabilitv 0.009 179 0. 160382 0.002774 0.00003 1 0.000000 0.570330 
Sum 394.421 8  402.63 16  332.2200 531 .0030 307.1441 4 19.5036 
Sum Sq. 
Dev. 4029.9 19  4 172.552 2628.984 6469.395 8524.5 15  4303.873 
Observation 







1 1 .22864 








Table 5 . 1 9  Emerging Economies: Export (Growth) 
Brazil India Mexico South Africa Turkev China 
Mean 7.203 1 06 9.845650 8.638130 2.436166 8.1 53809 22.78848 
Median 6.339102 8.001414 6.753459 2.770064 8.61 8763 23.91978 
Maximum 24. 163 17  3 1 .55782 45.853 1 2  10.9381 1 2 1 .95938 1 05.5179 
Minimum - 10.58055 -6.3 1491 1 - 10.85495 - 17.02382 - 10.67950 - 1 7.09717 
Std. Dev. 8. 104647 9.079021 9.236341 4.91 3420 5.745334 1 8.37758 
Skewness -0.03 1623 0.466763 1 .405287 - 1 . 1 72969 -0.477365 1 .665671 
Kurtosis 2.838654 2.952385 6.950604 6.544230 4.82901 8  9.950074 
Jarque-Bera 0.060065 1 .747476 47.0 13 19  36.12999 8.5 1 3634 1 1 8.8027 
Probability 0.970414 0.417388 0.000000 0.000000 0.014167 0.000000 
Sum 345.7491 472.5912 414.6302 1 16.9360 391 .3828 1 093.847 
Sum Sq. Dev. 3087.209 3874.146 4009.570 1 1 34.660 155 1 .4 17  1 5873.56 
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Table 5.20 Developing Economies: Export (Growth) 
Bani!ladesh Egypt Ghana Indonesia Kenva NW:eria Pakistan 
Mean 1 7.81337 19.43394 38.86528 19.65247 13.85560 25.9943 1 1 7.93998 
Median 1 7.49598 12. 1 1494 33.09139 16.35382 1 1 .20572 19.52418 1 3.78530 
Maximum 66.66667 97.76419  137.2175 143.2724 78.07972 1 55.8441 1 58.4167 
Minimum -3.629090 -25.68614 -21 .74192 -99.98716 - 1 9.4421 8  -41 . 16157 - 1 1 .60370 
Std. Dev. 1 3.21730 29.2 1551  36.77844 36.58998 16.97767 45.56403 25.57100 
Skewness 1 . 1 86723 0.975583 0.995 1 78 0.691099 1 .301208 1 .027506 3.603779 
Kurtosis 5.498007 3.523591 3.839451 7.043 13 1  6.208858 4.0 13017 20.27295 
Jarque-Bera 23.74657 8 . 162393 9.332395 36.51476 34. 13869 1 0.49855 700.6076 
Probability 0.000007 0.016887 0.009408 0.000000 0.000000 0.00525 1 0.000000 
Sum 855.04 17  932.8294 1 865.533 943.3 1 87 665.0689 1 247.727 861 . 1 1 89 
Sum Sq. 
!Dev. 8210.755 401 16.66 63574.73 62924.87 1 3547.34 97575.80 30732 . 17  
0 bservations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
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Table 5 .2 1 Hodrick Prescott and Kalman Correlation 
Kalman/HP Can i:;-ran Ger Ita Jo Uk Us Bra Ind Mex .zaf Tur Clm Ban Ell Gha Indo Ken Njg Pak 
!Canada 0.80 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
..... ... ranee - 0.78 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Germany - - 0.69 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
:talv - - - 0.73 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Japan - - - - 0.83 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
United Kiru!. - - - - 0.82 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
United States - - - - - - 0.85 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Brazil - - - - - - - 0.8 1  - - - - - - - - - - - -
India - - - - - - - - ).91 - - - - - - - - - - -
Mexico - - - - - - - - - 0.79 - - - - - - - - - -
South Africa - - - - - - - - - - 0.84 - - - - - - - - -
Turkey - - - - - - - - - - - 0.75 - - - - - - - -
China - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.99 - - - - - - -
B::inobdesh - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.76 - - - - - -
Egypt - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.86 - - - - -
Ghana - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.84 - - - -
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.87 - - -
Kenya - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kl.83 - -
Nigeria - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.84 -
Pakistan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.92 
Unit Root 
Table 5 .22 Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test 
Order of Order of Order of Integration 
Inte2:mtion Integration 
I(O) 1( 1 )  I(O) 1( 1 )  I(O) I( l )  
Series: Series: Prob. 
Series: Inflation Prob. Inflation Prob. IInflation 
Canada 0.2285 0.0000 Brazil 0.49 10  0.0000 R<:inol<:idesh 0.0001 -
France 0.7644 0.0002 India 0.00 1 3  - E!!YOt 0.0007 -
Gennanv 0.0344 - Mexico 0. 1 358 0.0000 Ghana 0.0001 -
Italv 0.7301 0.0000 South Africa 0.65 1 7  0.0000 Indonesia 0.0001 -
Jaoan 0.1438 0.0000 Turkey 0.1578 0.0000 Kenva 0.0001 -
United 
Kingdom 0. 1948 0.0000 China 0.0594 0.0000 Nigeria 0.0000 -
United State 0.3544 0.0498 0akistan 0.0004 -
Series: HP 
Series: HP Gao Gao Series: HP Gao 
Canada 0.0240 - Brazil 0.0260 - RanQladesh 0.7721 0.0000 
France 0.0205 - [ndia 0.2044 0.0000 El!YDt 0.0130 -
88 
Germany 0.0069 - Mexico 0.0933 0.0000 Ghana 0 . 1727 0.0000 
Italy 0.0479 - South Africa 0.0786 0.0001 [ndonesia 0.0702 0.0001 
Japan 0.22 1 8  0.0000 ITurkev 0.1493 0.0000 IKenva 0.0794 0.0000 
United 
Kingdom 0.0065 - China 0.0033 - Nigeria 0.23 1 8  0.0000 
United State 0.0095 - Pakistan 0 . 1684 0.0000 
Series: Kalman Series: Series: 
Gap IKahnan Gap IKahnan Gao 
Canada 0.1250 0.0000 Brazil 0.05 10  0.0002 R-:.nohdesh 0.8163 0.0000 
France 0. 1 1 37 0.0000 India 0.0562 0.0000 E!NOt 0.0001 -
Germany 0.0159 - Mexico 0.0385 - Ghana 0.2 1 3 1  0.0000 
Italy 0.0764 0.0000 South Africa 0. 1 047 0.0001 IIndonesia 0.0152 -
Japan 0.1 835 0.0000 Turkey 0.0443 0.0000 Kenya 0.0 191  -
United 
Kingdom 0.0185 - China 0.0019 0.0002 Nli!:eria 0. 1719 0.0000 
United State 0.0246 0.0006 0akistan 0.0187 -
Series: 
Series: Exchange Series: 
Excharure Rate Rate ExchanQ'e Rate 
Canada 0.0009 - Brazil 0.0046 - D..,nol-:.desh 0.1 545 0.0000 
France 0.0000 - India 0.001 2  - E!NDt 0.0087 -
Germany 0.0000 - Mexico 0.0000 - Ghana 0.0027 -
Italy 0.0000 - South Africa 0.0001 - Lndonesia 0.0000 -
Japan 0.0000 - rrurkev 0.0000 - Kenva 0.0000 -
United 
Kingdom 0.0001 - China 0.0095 - Nigeria 0.0000 -
United State 0.0029 - Pakistan 0.0000 -
Series: Trade Series: Trade Series: Trade 
Canada 0.0009 - IBrazil 0.0000 - n nuh.desh 0.0000 -
France 0.0000 - [ndia 0.0003 - EQVDt 0.0000 -
Germany 0.0000 - !Mexico 0.0000 - !Ghana 0.0004 -
Italy 0.0000 - South Africa 0.0000 - Indonesia 0.0000 -
Japan 0.0000 - ITurkev 0.0000 - Kenva 0.0000 -
United 
Kingdom 0.0001 - China 0.0002 - !Nigeria 0.0000 -
United State 0.0029 - Pakistan 0.0000 -
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Endogeneity Test 
Table 5 .23 Endogeneity Test: Backward- Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) 
Economies nt-1 y•hp 
CANADA Noise -6.41E-16 -2.41E-16 
FRANCE Noise -2.66E- 1 5  -3.07E- 16  
GERMANY Noise -9.19E-16 - 1 .22E- l 7 
ITALY Noise - l .59E- 1 5  -3.81E-l 7 
JAPAN Noise 2.64E-l 7 - l .09E- 16  
UNITED Noise -8.07E-l 7 5.97E- 1 7  
KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES Noise -2.73E- 16  -2. 13E- 16  
Table 5.24 Endogeneity Test: Forward-Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) 
Economies 1rt+ 1 y•hp 
CANADA Noise 1 .4 1E- 1 7  -4.75E- 1 7  
FRANCE Noise -2.67E- 1 5  -4.74E- 1 7  
GERMANY Noise 8.43E- 16  l .07E- 16  
ITALY Noise -6.08E- 16  - l .40E- 16  
JAPAN Noise 2.76E- 1 7  -9.6 1E- 1 8  
UNITED Noise 2.47E- 1 6  -3.70E- 1 7  
KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES Noise l .56E- 1 5  1 .SOE- 1 6  
Table 5.25 Endogeneity Test: Back-Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) 
Economies 1rt- 1 y•hp 
BRAZIL Noise -6.84E- 16  l .99E- 1 7  
INDIA Noise 2.27E- 16  l .85E-l 6 
MEXICO Noise 1 .75E- 16  4.59E- 1 7  
SOUTH AFRICA Noise - l .40E- 1 5  -9.70E- 17 
TIJRKEY Noise - l  .78E- 16  4.16E- 16  
CHINA Noise 2.07E- 16  -8.97E- 1 7  




-2.SlE- 16  1 . 1 9E- 16  
-2.32E- 1 5  -9.06E- l 7 
- l . 14E- 1 5  -3.34E- 1 7  
-2.3 1 E- 1 5  1 .34E- 1 6  
2.0lE- 16  - l .79E- 16  
-2.30E- 1 7  1 .47E- 16  
- 1 .96E- 1 5  .-3.61E- l 6 
M ultivariate Output Gap 
(Kalman) 
1rt+ 1  y•Km 
1 .4 1E- 1 7  - l . 1 9E-16 
-2.98E- 1 5  -2.28E- 16  
7.12E- 1 6  3.93E- 1 7  
-2.43E- 16  3.46E- 16  
3.71E- 1 7  -8.78E- 1 7  
2.19E- 16  7.35E- 1 8  
5.65E- 16  -6.4E- l 7 
M ultivariate Output Gap 
(Kalman) 
rrt- 1 y•Km 
-6.98E- 16  3 .47E- 1 7  
9.3 1 E- 1 7  l .07E- 16  
-4.52E- 18  -8.86E- 1 7  
- l .54E- 1 5  6.83E- 1 7  
-2.08E- 1 7  -2.04E- 14 
-2.06E- 16  -3.40E- 16  
90 
Table 5 .26 Endogeneity Test: Forward-Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) 
Economies 1rt+1 y•hp 
BRAZIL Noise 6.20E- 1 6  3.02E- 1 7  
INDIA Noise -6.35E- 1 6  l .84E- 1 7  
MEXICO Noise 3.85E- 1 7  -3.32E- l 7 
SOUIB AFRICA Noise -3.85E- 1 5  6.23E- 1 7  
TURKEY Noise 7. 12E-16 l .80E- 16  
CHINA Noise -9.00E- 1 7  -6. l l E- 1 7  
Table 5.27 Endogeneity Test: Back-Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) 
Economies 1rt+1 y•hp 
Barurladesh Noise 2.06E- 16  -2.7 1E- 17 
Egypt Noise -8.25E- 16  5.72E- l 7 
Ghana Noise 9.SOE- 16  3.21E- 1 7  
Indonesia Noise 5.44E- 16  l .34E-l 7 
Kenva Noise -7.54E- 16  - l .03E- 1 7  
NU!eria Noise -2.SOE- 16  - l .94E- 1 7  
Pakistan Noise - l .40E- 1 5  6.03E- 1 7  
Table 5.28 Endogeneity Test: Forward-Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) 
Economies 1rt+1 y•hp 
Barurladesh Noise 3.79E- 16  -6. 1 6E- l 7 
Egypt Noise -9.20E- 16  2.68E- 17 
Ghana Noise -3.06E- 16  -4.43E-l 7 
Indonesia Noise -3.36E- 16  3.66E- 1 7  
Kenya Noise -2.82E- 16  -2.30E-l 7 
Nigeria Noise -2. 1 5E- 16  -3.44E- 17  
Pakistan Noise -2.57E- 1 5  4.20E- 1 7  
Multivariate Output Gap 
(Kalman) 
1rt+ 1 y•Km 
7.88E- 1 6  l . 1 6E- 1 6  
-9. 13E- 16  -5.63E- 16  
-3.59E- 16  -8.48E-l 7 
-3.4 1E- 1 5  l .48E- 1 6  
9.32E- 1 6  2 . l  7E- 1 6  
-3.33E- l 7 - l .56E- 16  
Multivariate Output Gap 
(Kalman) 
1rt+1 y•Km 
2.79E- 16  -6.65E- 1 7  
- l .  IOE- 1 6  - l .02E- 16  
8.6 1E- 1 6  -7.95E-l 7 
-2.16E- 16  8.60E- 1 7  
-8.57E- 1 6  5.29E- 1 7  
- l .87E- 16  -4.59E- 1 7  
-2.02E- 1 5  -6.70E- 1 7  
Multivariate Output Gap 
(Kalman) 
rr,.�1 y•Km 
3. 1 7E-16 l .38E-l 6 
l .35E- 1 6  - l .83E- 1 8  
8.26E- 1 7  -2.27E- 1 7  
-2.1 3E- 1 7  l .30E- 1 6  
-5.ISE- 1 6  - l .23E- 1 7  
-3.36E- 16  -6.02E- l 7 
-2.63E- 1 5  l . 1 4E-16 
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Regression Results 
Table 5.29 Developed Economies: Open Economy - Backward Looking Model 
Uniwriate Output Gap (HP) Multiwriate Output Gap (Kalman) 
81 yhP "' T 81 yKm "' T 
GMM .85(0.00) .36(0.00) .13(0.01) .81(0.00) .37(0.00) . 18(0.00) 
CANADA 2SLS .83(0.00) .34(0.00) . 15(0.00) .79(0.00) .40(0.01) .21(0.00) 
BAYES .88 .27 .49 .90 .05 .50 
OLS .81(0.00) .21(0.02) .20(0.00) .18(0.00) .80(0.00) .33(0.01) .23(0.00) .23(0.00) 
GMM .90(0.00) .17(0.02) .21(0.00) .07(0.00) .92(0.00) .32(0.00) .06(0.007) 
FRANCE 2SLS .9(0.00) .25(0.00) .24(0.05) .10(0.04) .8(0.00) .28(0.03) .12(0.02) 
BAYES .91 .20 .14 .08 .95 .28 .5 
OLS .92(0.00) .19(0.03) . 14(0.02) .08(0.00) .92(0.00) .25(0.01) .14(0.02) . 10(0.00) 
GMM .91(0.00) .24(0.00) .02(0.00) .89(0.00) .22(0.00) .10(0.00) .04(0.00) 
GERMANY 2SLS .89(0.00) .23(0.00) .04(0.22) .88(0.00) .23(0.01) . 12(0.07) .05(0.10) 
BAYES .85 .09 .02 .84 .18 .09 .03 
OLS .73(0.00) .1 1(0.08) .06(0.09) .75(0.00) . 16(0.07) .08(0.03) 
GMM .91(0.00) . 10(0.60) . 14(0.02) .90(0.00) . 15(0.10) .17(0.0l) 
ITALY 2SLS .89(0.00) .22(0.41) .24(0.032) .83(0.00) .46(0.17) .36(0.01) 
BAYES .94 .012 .08 .93 .05 . 13  
OLS .95(0.00) .24(0.09) .09(0.08) .95(0.00) . 13(0.00) 
GMM .80(0.00) .22(0.02) . 12(0.02) .74(0.00) .06(0.06) .15(0.00) 
JAPAN 2SLS .55(0.001) .26(0.001) .59(0.00) .04(0.5) .23(0.001) 
BAYES .67 .07 . 14 .68 . 1 1  . 14 
OLS .69(0.00) . 13(0.00) .16(0.00) .71(0.00) .12(0.05) .12(0.00) .15(0.00) 
GMM .96(0.00) .36(0.001) .25(0.026) .94(0.00) .48(0.005) .23(0.004) 
UNITED 2SLS .98(0.00) .52(0.02) .93(0.00) .66<0.004) 
KINGDOM BAYES .90 .27 .91 .52 
OLS .79(0.00) .81(0.00) .50(0.01) 
GMM .87(0.00) .08(0.00) .84(0.00) .21(0.03) .10(0.09) . 10(0.00) 
UNITED 2SLS .88(0.00) .19(0.007) .08(0.006) .82(0.00) .27(0.002) . 14(0.04) . 12(0.00) 
STATES BAYES .88 .08 .06 .88 .14 .03 .07 
OLS .90(0.00) .06(0.00) .91(0.00) . 14(0.020 0.02(0.00) 
Table 5.30 Emerging Economies : Open Economy - Backward Looking Model 
Uniwriate Output Gap (BP) Multiwriate Output Gap (Kalman) 
81 yhP "' T 81 yKm "' T 
GMM .96(0.00) -.47(0.02) 1.00(0.00) 
BRAZlL 2SLS 1 .09(0.00) 1.31(0.00) 
BAYES .92 -.14 .92 
OLS .89(0.00) .89(0.00) 
GMM .95(0.00) -.2(0.007) -.2(0.6) 
INDlA 2SLS .99(0.00) -.6(0.04) 
BAYES .73 -.06 .001 
OLS .36(0.02) .30(0.03) .26(0.02) 
GMM .89(0.00) .81(0.002) -.87(0.00) .41(0.06) .96(0.00) -.8(0.00) 
MEXICO 2SLS .87(0.00) -.89(0.01) 1.0(0.00) -1 .0(0.06) 
BAYES .89 .89 -.7 . 19 .87 -.61 
OLS .85(0.00) -.69(0.00) .83(0.00) -.62(0.01) 
GMM .95(0.00) . 13(0.08) .95(0.00) .05(0.76) .16(0.02) 
SOUTH 2SI..S .86(0.00) .76(0.00) 
AFRICA BAYES .93 .IO .92 . 14 .10 
92 
OLS .67(0.00) .67(0.00) .08(0.09) 
TURKEY GMM .91(0.00) 1.77(0.006) .98(0.00) 1 .01(0.06) -.7(0.006) 
2SLS .92(0.00) .95(0.00) 
BAYES .92 .89 1.78 -.39 
OLS .81(0.00) 1.08(0.08) .78(0.00) l .64(0.03) 
GMM .81(0.00) -.03(0.00) .07(0.002) .74{0.00) -.04{0.00) .10(0.00) 
CHJNA 2SLS .78(0.00) .08(0.08) .72(0.00) . 1 1(0.016) 
BAYES .69 -.03 .08 .69 -.03 .08 
OLS .68(0.00) -.03(0.09) .08(0.01) .68(0.00) -.03(0.06) -.08(0.08) .08(0.01) 
Table 5.31 Developing Economies : Open F.conomy - Backward Looking Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) Multivariate Output Gap (Kalman) 
61 
yhP q> T 61 yKm q> T 
GMM 1.4(0.00) -.7(0.03) -.7(0.00) .91(0.00) .58(0.028) -.88(0.00) 
BAN 2SLS 1.32(0.07) -.6(0.03) .88(0.02) -.84(0.00) 
BAYES .46 .72 -.46 .42 .78 -.46 
OLS .33(0.03) .51(0.04) -.49(0.0) .30(0.04) .56(0.03) -.49(0.00) 
GMM .85(0.00) .65(0.002) .26(0.00) .93(0.00) .55(0.07) . 14(0.015)  
EGY 2SLS .84(0.00) 95(0.00) 
BAYES .79 .08 -.003 .80 .13 .09 
OLS .27(0.06) .07(0.04) .30(0.04) .07(0.03) 
GMM 1 . 15(0.00) 1.08(0.00) -.36(0.07) 
GHA 2SLS .95(0.007) .87(0.008) 
BAYES .55 .55 .23 
OLS .36(0.00) -.57(0.0) .36(0.00) -.58(0.00) 
GMM .60(0.00) .69(0.00) .62(0.00) .76(0.00) 
INDO 2SLS .59(0.00) .71(0.00) .61(0.00) .73(0.00) 
BAYES .53 .52 .54 .51 
OLS .43(0.00) .16(0.00) .46 (0.0) .44(0.00) . 16(0.00) .45(0.00) 
GMM .7(0.00) .28(0.00) -.13(0.0) .73(0.00) 
KEN 2SLS .75(0.00) .71(0.00) 
BAYES .63 .24 .029 .63 
OLS .23(0.08) .20(0.00) .23(0.08) .20(0.01) 
GMM .68(0.00) .33(0.00) .21(0.04) .60(0.00) .29(0.019) .34{0.024) 
NIG 2SLS .55(0.07) 
BAYES .34 .06 . 15  .34 .09 . 15  
OLS 
GMM .92(0.00) .76(0.00) .64(0.00) .7(0.00) .9(0.00) .63(0.001) 
PAK 2SLS .83(0.01) 
BAYES 
OLS .33(0.03) .26(0.06) .81(0.02) 
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Table 5.32 Developed F.conomies : Open F.conomy - Baseline Model 
Uniwriate Output Gap (HP) Multiwriate Output Gap (Kalman) 
61 
yAP "' T 61 yKm "' T 
GMM 1.14(0.00) -.20(0.00) .20(0.00) -.04(0.08) 1 . 1(0.00) -.3(0.00) . 15(0.00) -.07(0.0) 
CANADA 2SLS 1.0(0.00) 
BAYES .91 .07 .49 .49 .91 .09 .49 .50 
OLS .75(0.00) .09(0.47) .14(0.06) .04(0.38) .74(0.00) . 15(0.03) 
CMM 1 . 13(0.00) -.19(0.04) -.12(0.03) 1 . 15(0.00) -.12(0.07) 
FRANCE 2SLS 1 . 1 7(0.00) -.19(0.09) -.14(0.04) 1 . 1(0.00) -.09(0.6) -.17(0.05) 
BAYES 1 .0 -.17 .49 .9 .49 .49 
.99(0.00) -.06(0.07) .99(0.00) -.07(0.03) 
GMM 1.2(0.00) -.10(0.00) -.1 1(0.00) -.15(0.00) 1 . 18(0.00) -.10(0.05) -.10(0.04) 
GERMANY 2SLS 1.27(0.00) -.15(0.00) 1 . 19(0.00) -. 1 1 (0.01) 
BAYES 1.06 -.07 .02 -.04 1.06 .02 -.04 
OLS .92(0.00) -.05(0.03) .91(0.00) -.06(0.02) 
GMM 1.03(0.00) -.12(0.05) .31(0.00) 1 . 1 1(0.00) 
ITALY 2SLS 1.02(0.00) 
BAYES .99 -.04 .08 1.00 
OLS .94(0.00) 
CMM 1 . 13(0.00) .02(0. 12) .04(0.01 )  1.23(0.00) .22(0.00) 
JAPAN 2SLS .99(0.001 )  1 . 1 5(0.00) 
BAYES .67 .10 . I I  .65 .06 
OLS .67(0.00) -.21(0.07) . 1 1(0.02) . 1 1(0.00) .64(0.00) . 10(0.03) . 10(0.02) 
GMM 1 . 12(0.00) -.3(0.07) -.15(0.02) 1 . 12(0.00) -.17(0.01) 
UNITED 2SLS 1 . 14(0.00) -.38(0.04) -.24(0.08) 1 . 12(0.00) 
KINGOOM BAYES 1 .02 -.29 -.22 1.02 -.24 
OLS .88(0.00) -.25(0.00) .87(0.00) -.27 (0.0) 
GMM 1 .21(0.00) -.06(0.06) .04(0.27) -.1(0.007) 1.23(0.00) - .03(0.48) - . 1 1 (0.02) 
UNITED .08(0.07) 
STATES 2SLS 1.22(0.00) -.12(0.01) l.21(0.00) -.12(0.01) 
BAYES 1.04 -.10 .04 -.03 1.05 -.JO .03 -.04 
OLS .98(0.00) -.04(0.09) .99(0.00) -.05(0.03) 
Table 5.33 F.merging F.conomies : Open F.conomy - Baseline Model 
Uniwriate Outout Gao (HP) Multiwriate Outnut Gao <Kalman) 
6, yhP "' T 6, yKm "' T 
CMM .78(0.00) 1 . 18(0.1 1) 1.07(0.00) -6.3(0.00) -1.7(0.04) 
BRAZIL 2SLS .7(0.00) .5 1(0.72) 1 .04(0.00) -5.8(0.08) 
BAYES .95 .004 .95 -.38 . 15  
OLS .88(0.00) .88(0.00) 
GMM 1 . 18(0.00) 1.26(0.05) 
INDIA 2SLS 
BAYES .74 .68 
OLS .42(0.00) .35(0.02) .20(0.06) .12(0.05) 
G\1M .95(0.00) -1 .2(0.00) .31(0.03) .30(0. 1 1) .85(0.00) -.71(0.34) .2(0.39) .5(0.00) 
MEXICO 2SLS 1 .0(0.00) .86(0.00) 
BAYES .86 -1.38 .35 .22 .86 -1 .07 .22 .22 
OLS .81(0.00) -1 .4(0.03) .81(0.00) 
GMM 1 .05(0.00) 1.07(0.00) .04(0.24) 
SOlf H 2SLS 1 . 1 1(0.00) 1.01(0.00) 
AFRICA BAYES .95 .94 .10 .07 
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OLS .64(0.00) .64(0.00) 
G\1M 1 .09(0.00) -1.5(0.03) 1.01(0.00) 
TURKEY 2SLS 1 . 15(0.00) 1.03(0.00) 
BAYES .92 -1.2 .02 .07 .90 -.46 -.JO . JO  
OLS .81(0.00) -1.1(0.07) .77(0.00) 
GMM 1.08(0.00) .97(0.001) 
CHINA 2SLS 1 . 17(0.00) 1.05(0.00) 
BAYES .80 -.0003 .014 .01 .80 
OLS .67(0.00) .67(0.00) 
Table 5.34 Developing Economies : Open Economy - Baseline Model 
Univariate Output Gao (HP) Multiwriate Outnut Gap (Kalman 
61 yhP "' T 61 yKm "' T 
GMM 1.15(0.00) .63(0.00) - .85(0.00) -
BANGLADESH 1.7(0.03) .34(0.00) 
2SLS .9(0.00) .66(0.08) .67(0.00) 1.0(0.02) 
BAYES .44 1 . 17  .46 -.9 -.36 -.36 
OLS .35(0.00) 1.03(0.00) -.36(0.0) .37(0.00) 1.06(0.00) -.38(0.0) 
GMM .75(0.00) . 15(0.06) .85(0.00) .15(0.005) 
EGYPT 2SLS .74(0.00) .77(0.00) .18(0.09) 
BAYES .78 .028 .78 .028 
OLS .26(0.08) .27(0.07) 
Clv1M .95(0.00) .88(0.00) .12(0.048) 
GHANA 2SLS .85(0.00) .80(0.00) 
BAYES .56 .56 .31 
OLS .27(0.00) -.39(0.03) .28(0.00) -.4(0.03) 
GMM 1.09(0.00) 1 . 1 1(0.00) 
INDONESIA 2SLS 1.05(0.00) 1.07(0.00) 
BAYES .45 .44 
OLS . 16(0.0) .33(0.00) . 19(0.00) .32(0.00) 
GMM .71(0.00) -.3(0.00) .37(0.00) .72(0.00) .31(0.00) 
KENYA 2SLS .69(0.00) .39(0.00) .68(0.00) .35(0.03) 
BAYES .67 -.14 .27 .67 
OLS .28(0.05) .22(0.00) -. 16(0.05) .26(0.07) .22(0.01) -.2(0.07) 
GMM .57(0.00) .39(0.00) .47(0.00) .51(0.001 ) 
NIGERIA 2SLS .53(0.09) 
BAYES .34 -.028 .09 .31 .34 .016 .09 .31 
OLS 






Table 5.35 Developed Economies: Open Economy - Hybrid Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) Multivariate Output Gap (Kalman) 
61 62 yhP <p T 61 62 yKm <p T 
GMM .32(0.00) .71(0.00) .12(0.00) .39(0.0) .63(0.0) . 14(0.0) 
CAN 2SLS .73(0.00) .27(0.09) .75(0.00) . 15(0.09) 
BAYES .51 .45 .45 .49 .49 .49 
OLS .60(0.00) .34(0.00) . 10(0.22) .18(0.00) . 13(0.00) .60(0.00) .33(0.00) .20(0.08) .20(0.00) . 16(0.00) 
GMM .24(0.05) .85(0.00) -.09(0.0) .36(0.00) .71(0.00) -.07(0.01) 
FRA 2SLS .82(0.02) .33(0.07) .74(0.00) 
BAYES .52 .47 .50 .52 .48 .49 
OLS .53(0.00) .46(0.00) .54(0.00) .46(0.00) 
GMM .49(0.00) .61(0.00) .07(0.00) -.04(0.0) -.05(0.0) .42(0.00) .69(0.00) . 10(0.00) - -.05(0.02) 
GER .03(0.05) 
2SLS .49(0.00) .61(0.00) .42(0.00) .70(0.00) -.06<0.07) 
BAYES .43 .56 .007 .037 -.023 .45 .54 . I  I .04 -.01 
OLS .39(0.00) .53(0.00) .40(0.00) .52(0.00) 
GM M  .28(0.00) .73(0.00) .25(0.00) .25(0.00) .83(0.00) 
ITA 2SLS .30(0.05) .69(0.00) .26(0.20) .77(0.00) 
BAYES .52 .47 .01 .50 .49 
OLS .53(0.00) .47(0.00) .52(0.00) .49(0.00) 
GMM .37(0.00) .68(0.00) .13(0.00) .05(0.2) .39(0.00) .64(0.00) . 1 1(0.001) 
JP 2SLS .37(0.05) 
BAYES .46 .34 -.03 . I  I .51 .31 .20 
.49(0.00) .34(0.00) .10(0.00) .12(0.00) .53(0.00) .30(0.00) . 19(0.07) .09<0.0 I) . 1 1(0.00) 
GMM .27(0.01) .83(0.00) -.1(0.05) .29(0.00) .80(0.00) -.13(0.00) 
UK 2SLS .9(0.00) -.2(0.07) .87(0.00) -.19(0.08) 
BAYES .42 .62 -.17 .47 .57 -.17 
OLS .38(0.00) .60<0.00) -.19(0.0) .42(0.00) .55(0.00) -.19(0.00) 
GM M  1 . 19(0.00) -. 1(0.08) .99(0.00) 
us 2SLS - 1.35(0.01 )  .96(0.005 ) 
.09(0.80) 
BAYES .48 .51 .008 .48 
OLS .50(0.00) .51(0.00) .52(0.00) .48(0.00) 
Table 5.36 Emerging Economies: Open Economy - Hybrid Model 
Univariate Output Gap (HP) Multivariate Output Gao 'Kalman) 
61 62 yhP <p T 61 62 yKm <p T 
.84(0.00) -.3(0.05) 1 .06(0.00) -5.3(0.0) -1 .2(02) 
BRA 1.27(0.09) -2.5(0.4) 
.49 .025 .48 . 1 7  .03 
.48(0.00) .49(0.00) .49(0.00) .48(0.00) 
1 .09(0.00) .8(0.003) 
IND 
.51 .47 
.28(0.06) .4-0(0.01) .31(0.03) .24(0.03) 
.94(0.00) .97(0.002) -.9(0.00) .45(0.06) .83(0.00) -.6(0.00) 
MEX 
.53 -.38 -.26 .03 .55 -.32 
.53(0.00) .45(0.00) .55(0.00) .44(0.00) 
.34(0.02) .7(0.00) -.12(0.15) .05(0.15) -.04(0.2) .06(0.75) 1.0(0.00) -. 1(0.2) .04(0.17) -.05(0.3) 
ZAF .82(0.04) .79(0.07) 
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.50 .48 .006 .09 .06 .50 .48 .07 . 10 .07 
.44(0.00) .433(0.00) .09(0.05) .44(0.00) .42(0.00) .10(0.05) 
TUR .95(0.004) .31(0.07) .68(0.00) -.6(0.040 
.50 .48 -.09 -.37 -.05 .53 .44 .58 -.36 -.008 
.48(0.00) .46(0.00) .51(0.00) .41(0.00) 
.47(0.005) .46(0.062) .04(0.03) .66(0.00) .081(0.0) 
CHN .67(0.029) 
.51 .42 -.010 -.011 .032 .51 .03 
.56(0.00) .44(0.00) .56(0.00) .43(0.00) 
Table 5.37 Developing Economies : Open Economy - Hybrid Model 
Univariate Outout Gao ( HP) Multivariate Output Gao (Kalman) 
81 82 yhP "' T 81 82 yKm "' T 
.87(0.00) .83(0.00) -.4(0.00) .6(0.00) 1.7(0.09) 1 .04(0.002) -.3(0.02) 
BANG .85(0.007) .65(0.00) 
1 . 17 .44 -1.33 1.14 -.38 




.32(0.03) .33(0.03) .35 
.86 -.9(0.00) 1 .58(0.00) .40(0.009) 
GHA .9(0.01) 1.6( 0.04) 
.49 .49 
.26(0.00) -.52(0.0) .35(0.00) -.5(0.00) 
.38(0.00) .40(0.007) .47(0.00) .42(0.00) .35(0.03) .54(0.00) 
INDON. .46(0.03) .56(0.04) .47(0.04) .58(0.04) 
.47 .48 .47 .47 
.42(0.00) . 16(0.00) .45(0.00) .42(0.00) . 17(0.00) .44(0.00) 
.27(0.00) .54(0.00) . 18(0.005) .35(0.00) .49(0.00) 
KENYA .50(0.004) .28(0.06) .50(0.002) 
.37 -.027 -.08 .37 .42 
.19(0.01) .19(0.02) 
.81(0.001)  .38(0.002) .22(0.09) 1.01(0.01 )  .51(0.002) 
NIG 
.25 .24 -.007 .10 .25 .25 .24 .03 .10 .25 




Table 5.38 Developed f.conomies : Open f.conomy - Restricted Backward Looking Model 
GMM Uniwriate Output Gap (HP) Hasen's J Multiwriate Output Gap (Kalman) Has en's 
J 
(.c) yhP "' T (.c) yKm "' T 
CAN .34(0.00) . 13(0.00) .05(0.00) 0.73 .41(0.00) . 13(0.00) .04(0.01) 0.68 
FRA .45(0.00) . 14(0.01) 0.64 .45(0.00) . 16(0.00) 0.65 
GER .57(0.00) .12(0.00) 0.51 .48(0.00) . 1 5(0.00) .03(0.05) 0.42 
ITA .29(0.00) .30(0.00) .03(0.01) 0.78 .33(0.00) . 12(0.00) .03(0.03) 0.76 
JP .39(0.00) .14(0.00) 0.72 .42(0.00) . 1 1(0.00) .07(0.00) 0.69 
UK .32(0.00) 0.89 .30(0.00) -.06(0.03) 0.87 
us .43(0.00) .07(0.00) 0.58 .38(0.00) .08(0.03) 0.61 
Table 5.39 Emerging f.conomies : Open f.conomy - Restricted Backward Looking Model 
GMM Uniwriate Output Gap (HP) Hase Multiwriate Output Gap (Kalman) Has 
n's J en's 
J 
(.c) yhP "' T "' yKm "' T 
BRA .94(0.00) -.45(0.02) 0.56 -3.95(0.0 I) - 1 . 13(0.04) 0.53 
IND .12(0.02) 0.71 . 1 3(0.003) 0.54 
MEX .75(0.00) -.6(0.00) 0.60 .91(0.00) -.79(0.00) 0.55 
ZAF .39(0.00) .08(0.00) 0.54 .30(0.00) .09(0.00) 0.55 
TUR .7(0.00) -.63(0.05) 0.84 .3 1(0.09) -.58(0.05) 0.80 
CHN .49(0.00) .08(0.02) .03(0.02) 0.42 .60(0.00) .07(0.02) .04(0 0.46 
.00) 
Table 5.40 Developing f.conomies : Open f.conomy - Restricted Backward Looking Model 
GMM Uniwriate Output Gap (HP) Has en's Multiwriate Output Gap (Kalman) Hase 
J n's J 
(.c) yhP "' T "' yKm "' T 
BAN .48(0.00) -.25(0.0) 0.82 .38(0.00) -.3(0.00) 0.72 
EGY .52(0.00) 0.69 .48(0.00) .39(0.01) . 1 1(0.00) 0.90 
GHA .34(0.08) 0.76 
INDO .24(0.00) .27(0.00) 0.84 .26(0.00) .24(0.08) - .29(0.00) 0.85 
.08(0.04) 
KEN .44(0.00) . 14(0.00) -. 14(0.09) 0.72 .51(0.00) .31(0.09) 0.85 
NIG 1.07(0.0) .41(0.03) 0.77 1 . 18(0.00) .36(0.06) 0.79 
PAK .49(0.06) -.27(0.08) .37(0.02) 0.49 
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Post Estimation 
Table 5 .4 1 Post Estimation 
Hasen's J /Sargan, Chi2- (P-�) 
Backward Looking Model-
Developed Economies (HP) 
GMM 2SLS 
Canada 0.5768 0.0504 
France 0.5349 0.3147 
Germany 0.7276 0. 1 1 8 1  
Italy 0. 1296 0.0596 
Japan 0.4393 0.1885 
United Kingdom 0.6881 0.3879 
United States 0.6638 0.0042 
Backward Looking Model-
Errern:in!! Economies 
Mexico 0.5969 0.2236 
Turkey 0.8509 0.8987 
China 0.3929 0.0640 
Backward Looking Model-
Developing Economies 
Egypt 0.8212 0.4381 
Nigeria 0.8666 0.7367 
Pakistan 0.3360 0.1525 
Convex-Restricted Looking 
Model- Developing Economies 
Egypt -
Kenya -
Hasen's J /Sargan, Chi2- (P-value) 
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Fig. 5 . l a&b Canada: Output Gap and Inflation 
Canada Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean 0.060656 0.060656 
Median 0.338589 0.569250 
Maximum 3.287864 3.613361 
Minim.im -4.438206 -5.647248 
Std. Dev. 2.160698 2.697673 
Skewness -0.569842 -0.586917 
Kurtosis 2.279302 2.192760 
Jarque-Bera 3.560813 3.974483 
Probability 0.168570 0.137073 
Sum 2.850854 2.850854 
Sum Sq. Dev. 214.7564 334.7623 1975 1980 19� l!i90 1 �  2001' 2005 2010 2015 






Std. Dev. 3.525731 





Sum SQ. Dev. 571.8159 
Observations 47 
1975 1980 1985 ,� 19&5 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5. lb 
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Fig. 5 .2a&b France: Output Gap and Inflation 
France Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean 0.054021 0.054021 
Median -0.148931 0.023385 
Maximum 3.068772 4.116088 
Minimum -2.591 166 -3.013371 
Std. Dev. 1.551377 1 .987883 
Skewness 0.094076 0.174051 
Kurtosis 1.988828 1 .900473 
Jarque-Bera 2.071661 2.604848 
Probabilitv 0.354932 0.271872 
Sum 2.539000 2.53900  
Sum SQ. Dev. 1 10.7114 1 8 1 .7772 
1975 1960 1985 1990 1 995  2000 2005 2010 2015 
Observations 47 47 Fig.5.2a I- Kalman - Hodri� Pruoon I 





Minimum 0.1 36763 




Probabilitv 0.01 7522 
Sum 1 97.0045 
Sum SQ. Dev. 748.9185 
Observations 47 
1975 1980 1985 1990 19&5 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5.2b 
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Fig. 5.3a&b Germany: Output Gap and lnflation 
Gennanv Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean -0.005480 -0. 005480 
Median 0.508331 0.452460 
Maxim.Jm 2.952610 4.341396 
Minimum -3.39231 2  -4.851903 
Std. Dev. 1.582140 2.266017 
2 
Skewness -0.549067 -0.349670 
Kurtosis 2.569855 2.436736 0 
Jaraue-Bera 2.723892 1.579090 
Probabilitv 0.256162 0.454051 ·2 
Sum -0.257544 -0.257544 
Sum Sa. Dev. 1 1 5. 1456 236.2024 
Observations 47 47 197'5 1980 198S 1990 19116 2000 2005 3>10 2015 
Fig.5.3a I - � - Hod'ica Pr•ccitt I 
Gennanv Inflation 
Mean 2.535365 
Median 1 .975525 
Maximum 7.621336 
Minimum -0.449788 





Sum 1 1 9.1621 
Sum Sa. Dev. 167.3577 
Observations 47 197, 1980 1985 1990 19915 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5.3b 
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Std. Dev. 1 .818269 
Skewness 0.501974 













































Fig.5.4a I- Kalman - Hooncic P ruoon I 
Fig.5.4b 
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Fig. 5.5a&b Japan: Output Gap and Inflation 
Jaoan Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean -0.156675 -0.1 56675 
Median -0.226659 -0.467394 
Maximum 5.762074 7.046628 
Minimum -4.285406 -5.351799 
Std. Dev. 2.69201 3  3.24 1 1 22 
Skewness 0.257965 0.340342 
Kurtosis 2.209365 2.3161 17 
Jarque-Bera 1.745439 1.823259 
Probability 0.417814 0.401869 
Sum -7.363736 -7.363736 
Sum So. Dev. 333.3590 483.2240 
Observations 47 47 197!) 1980 1985 19!KI 198!5 2000 2005 2:)10 Z>1!i 
Fig.5.5a I - Kam.. - Hoaick Pr. cxtt I 
Jaoan Inflation Japat nftation 
Mean 1 .829907 
Median 0.568373 
Maximum 20.81005 
Minimum -1 .895164 
Std. Dev. 4.1 34623 
Skewness 2.58612�' 
Kurtosis 1 1 .29305 
Jarque-Bera 187.0736 
Probability 0.00000  
Sum 86.00564 
Sum Sq. Dev. 786.3748 
Observations 47 
1975 1 980  1985 1990 19" 2000 Z>05 2010 2015 
Fig.5.5b 
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Fig. 5 .6a&b United Kingdom: Output Gap and Inflation 
United Kingdom Kahnan Hodrick Prescott 
Mean -0.020254 -0.020254 
Median 0. 104140 -0.561962 
Maximum 5.762068 8.219922 
Minimum -5.052738 -5.496036 
Std. Dev. 2.609821 3.165824 
Skewness 0.135722 0.389359 
Kurtosis 2.404056 2.451591 
Jarque-Bera 0.839794 1 .77651 1  
Probability 0.6571 14 0.41 1373 
Sum -0.951952 -0.951953 
Sum Sq. Dev. 313.3136 461.0322 
Observations 47 47 
Fig.5.6a I - Klllrren - Ho:tidl Pr.soon I 
United K.ingodm Inflation 





Std. Dev. 5.500817 





Sum Sq. Dev. 1391.913 
Observations 47 
1"7'1 1� 1!'1$1'1 1..wl 1� ?000 �O'I ?010 ?01'1 
Fig.5.6b 
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Fig. 5.7a&b United States: Output Gap and Inflation 
United States Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
8 ...---------------------------------------------------------------..., Unied Stiles: OltJlUt Gap 
Mean -0.036549 -0.036549 
Median -0.274126 -0.3061% 
Maximum 4.300448 6.3665 13 
Minimum -5.922410 -6.809566 
Std. Dev. 2.472 1 1 7  2.880857 2 
Skewness -0.05 1909 0.084621 0 
Kurtosis 2.240216 2.608856 
Jaraue-Bera 1 . 151599 0.355705 ·2 
Probability 0.562255 0.837066 
Sum -1.717784 -1.717784 
Sum Sq. Dev. 281.1227 381 .7696 
Observations 47 47 1975 1980 198! t990 19915 200  2005 2)10 :1015 
Fig.5.7a I- i<.m.. - Hocticll Preoca I 
United Kins:wdm Inflation 
u.ted States. tlftation 
Mean 3.500657 
Median 2.551 295 
Maximum 9.336243 
Minimum 0.759435 
Std. Dev. 2.399847 




Sum 1 64.5309 




Fig. 5.8a&b Brazil: Output Gap and lnflation 
Brazil Kahnan Hodrick Prescott 
Mean 0.217277 0.217277 
Median 0.029095 -0. 1 1 1432 10 
Maximum 1 1 .58482 12.92682 
Minimum -1 0.32935 - 1 1 .74893 
Std. Dev. 4.191609 5.1 35574 
Skewness 0.1 74462 0.11 1891 0 
Kurtosis 3.228095 2.501243 
Jarque-Bera 0.340308 0.585222 .5 
Probability 0.843535 0.74631 2  
Sum 10.21202 10.21202 
·10 
Sum Sa. Dev. 808.201 1  1213.210 
Observations 47 47 
1 975  1980 1985 1990 1� .3)00 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5.8a I - Kalmen - Hodridt Pr• octt I 











Sum Sq. Dev. 1 1 1212.9 
Observations 47 
1975 1980 1� 1990 19&5 3:>00 3:)� 2010 2015 
Fig.5.8b 
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Maxintum 1 1 .98528 
Minimum -7.13291 1 
Std. Dev. 3.648612 











































1 1 50.186 
3992 1 . 1 7  
47 
1975 1980 1985 1990 19915 200  2005 2010 2)t5 
F·g 5 9a I - Klilrren - i-kxirO Pre cat I I . . . . 
,,.,� 1980 � 1990 ,� 2000 20� 2010 201� 
Fig.5.9b 
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Sum Sq. Dev. 
Observations 
Kalman 













1 . 104706 
0.946587 
16.28501 






















Fig.5. lOa I - Klll,,.n - Hodro Pre octt I 
Fig.5. lOb 
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Fig. 5 . 1  l a&b South Africa: Output Gap and Inflation 
South Africa Kalman 
Mean 0.059374 
Median 0.5 1 19!0 
Maximum 7.332405 
MinirTJ.Jm -5.32305 1 





















































4 �  .................................................................... ............................ _.... .......................................... ....... 
1975 1980 1985 '990 � 2)00 4005 �10 201 5  
Fig.5.1 la I - Kll,,..n - Hocri� Presoon I 
South Africa 
Fig.5.1 l b  
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Fig. 5 .  l 2a&b Turkey: Output Gap and Inflation 
h'urkev Kalman 
Mean 0.322881 
Median 1 . 136911 
Maximum 8.212360 
Minimum -8.958918 
Std. Dev. 4.066914 
Skewness -0.373733 
Kurtosis 2.597236 
Jarque-Bera 1 .411808 
Probability 0.493662 
Sum 15 . 17541 


















































Fig.5. 12a I - Kalrren - HcldrO Pr.cm I 
Tu�y 




Fig. 5 . l  3a&b China: Output Gap and Inflation 
China Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean 13.22529 13.22529 
Median 3.080421 4.268351 
Maximum 134.0179 130.6872 
Minimum -12.58217 -15.47693 
Std. Dev. 30.51279 30.70710 
Skewness 2.254538 2.052323 
Kurtosis 8.172541 7.305961 
Jarque-Bera 92.21 195 69.30426 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 621.5886 621.5886 
Sum Sq. Dev. 42827.41 43374.60 
Observations 47 47 
1m 1990 1995 1990 19915 200  2005 2010 z15 





Minimum -1 .268410 
Std. Dev. 4.648983 





Sum Sq. Dev. 994.1999 
Observations 47 197! 1geo 1985 1990 Hl95 2000 :.l!ClO! 2010 201! 
Fig.5.13b 
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Fig. 5 .  l 4a&b Bangladesh: Output Gap and inflation 





Std. Dev. 3.450647 
Skewness 2.785735 
Kurtosis 12.87263 
Jarque-Bera 251 .6655 
Probability 0.000000 
Sum -1.927244 














































1975 1980 19115 1980 1� 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5. l4a I - KmlrTWn - Hodric* Pre cxtt I 
1975 1980 1981! 1980 1� 3)00 20� 2010 2015 
Fig.5.14b 
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Maximum 1 8.30554 
Minimum -6.039786 
Std. Dev. 3.953591 
Skewness 2.399557 
Kurtosis 1 1 .75197 
Jaraue-Bera 1 95.1 058 
Probabilitv 0.000000 
Sum 3.1 03077 

















1 8 .79369 
-8.61 9667 10 
4.567431 


















1 7 1 9.607 ' 
47 0 
1� 1980 198� 1990 199!5 2COO 2005 21>10 2015 
Fig.5.15a I - K.irrwn - Hodridt PrecXJtt I 
Eg,-� 




Fig. 5 . l  6a&b Ghana: Output Gap and Inflation 
Olan a Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean 0.085219 0.085219 
Median 1.380420 0.865786 
Maximum 14.33346 17.39758 
Minim.Im -9.181339 -13. 16040 
Std. Dev. 5.560706 6.613741 
Skewness 0.002351 0.105721 
Kurtosis 2.393699 2.518945 
Jarque-Bera 0.719929 0.540739 
Probability 0.697701 0.763098 
Sum 4.005316 4.005312 
Sum Sq. Dev. 1422.387 2012. 1 1 2  
Observations 47 47 
1975 t980 198! 1 990  1'91! mo 200! 2010 Z>t! 
Fig.5. 1 6a I - K.i,,.n - HoOo<O Pr.cct1 I 
Ghana lr..i*>n 
E2vot Inflation 




Std. Dev. 6.114145 
Skewness 0.899055 
Kurtosis 4.37 1 3 1 6  
Jarque-Bera 1 0.01435 
Probability 0.006690 
Sum 507.7283 
Sum Sq. Dev. 1 7 1 9.607 
Observations 47 1975 1980 1986 1990 19M 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5. 1 6b 
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1m t980 '915 1990 199& 2»0 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5 . 1 7a I- Kllrren - Holc9'0 Pr. oott I 
Indonesia Inflation 
t975 t980 1985 t990 t995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Fig.5. 1 7b 
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Fig. 5 .  I 8a&b Kenya: Output Gap and Inflation 
Kenva Kalman Hodrick Prescott 
Mean 0.388127 0.388127 
Median -0.095581 -0.25 1 1 89 
Maximum 7.029647 9.042292 
Minimum -9.141257 -9.042331 
Std. Dev. 3.971548 4.792498 
Skewness -0.100615 -0.034718 
Kurtosis 2.289556 2.190748 
Jaraue-Bera 1.067730 1 .291933 
Probabilitv 0.586334 0.524156 
Sum 18.24197 1 8.24197 
Sum Sa. Dev. 725.5669 1056.530 
1975 1980 1985 1 990  1995 200  200� 2010 201� 
Observations 47 47 




Maximum 4 1 .98877 
Minimum -9.219158 
Std. Dev. 7.741058 





Sum Sq. Dev. 2756.503 
Observations 47 
19� 19'80 198� 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 201� 
Fig.5.18b 
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Fig.5.19a I- K.inwn - � Pr.cxx:t I 
1975 1980 19'8e 1980 19&5 2)00 2)05 2010 2015 
Fig.5.19b 
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Fig.5.20a I - K.irTWn - Hodridt: Pre cctt I 
Pajqstarr rtlotion 
1975 1980 1985 1'90 19&5 2000 .3>05 2010 201 5 
Fig.5.20b 
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